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Hierarchies allow individuals to leverage their knowledge through others' time. This mechanism increases
productivity and amplifies the impact of skill heterogeneity on earnings inequality. To quantify this
effect, we analyze the earnings and organization of U.S. lawyers and use the equilibrium model of
knowledge hierarchies in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to assess how much lawyers' productivity
and the distribution of earnings across lawyers reflects lawyers' ability to organize problem-solving
hierarchically. We analyze earnings, organizational, and assignment patterns and show that they are
generally consistent with the main predictions of the model. We then use these data to estimate the
model. Our estimates imply that hierarchical production leads to at least a 30% increase in production
in this industry, relative to a situation where lawyers within the same office do not "vertically specialize."
We further find that it amplifies earnings inequality, increasing the ratio between the 95th and 50th
percentiles from 3.7 to 4.8.  We conclude that the impact of hierarchy on productivity and earnings
distributions in this industry is substantial but not dramatic, reflecting the fact that the problems lawyers
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Knowledge is an asset with increasing returns because acquiring it involves a ￿xed cost;
this cost is independent of its subsequent utilization. But when knowledge is embodied
in individuals, they often must spend time applying it to each speci￿c problem they face
and possibly also communicating speci￿c solutions to others. This can make it di¢ cult
for individuals to exploit these increasing returns, relative to a situation where knowledge
can be encoded in blueprints, as in Romer (1986, 1990). For example, radiologists who
are experts at interpreting x-rays generally cannot sell their knowledge in a market like a
blueprint; instead, they usually must apply their knowledge to each patient￿ s speci￿c x-
ray. A way around this problem is vertical, or hierarchical, specialization where some non-
expert radiologists (e.g., residents) diagnose routine cases and request help from experts in
cases they ￿nd di¢ cult. Recent work in organizational economics, starting with Garicano
(2000), has analyzed how such knowledge hierarchies allow experts to exploit increasing
returns from their knowledge by leveraging it through others￿time.
What are the returns to "knowledge hierarchies?" In this paper we study this question
empirically in a context where production depends strongly on solving problems: legal ser-
vices. We analyze the earnings and organization of U.S. lawyers, and use the equilibrium
model of knowledge hierarchies in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to estimate the
returns to specialization that hierarchical production provides lawyers, and the impact
this has on earnings inequality among these individuals. We conclude that hierarchical
production has a substantial, but not dramatic, e⁄ect on lawyers￿productivity and the
distribution of lawyers￿earnings. Hierarchical production is valuable, but the return to
hierarchy is limited when, as in this case, the time costs associated with leveraging one￿ s
talent through others￿time are signi￿cant.
We proceed in two stages. We ￿rst propose an equilibrium model of problem-solving
hierarchies, and show that the main empirical implications of such a model are consistent
with our data, which come from the U.S. Economic Census and contain information on
partners￿earnings, associates￿earnings, and associate-partner ratios at thousands of law
o¢ ces throughout the United States. We then develop a structural estimation framework,
estimate the model￿ s parameters, and use these parameters to infer how much production
would be lost if partners were not able to "vertically specialize" by delegating work to
associates, and to construct earnings distributions across lawyers, comparing those we
observe to those that would obtain if lawyers could not organize hierarchically.
Throughout, our analysis exploits the insight that the organization of production and
earnings patterns within industries are jointly determined by the same underlying mecha-
nism: the equilibrium assignment of individuals to ￿rms and hierarchical positions. This
equilibrium assignment, in turn, re￿ ects the characteristics of the underlying production
1function (Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982)).1 This insight contains an important empirical
implication: earnings patterns contain a wealth of information that allows researchers to
better understand the nature of production in an industry, and in turn, the industry￿ s
equilibrium organization. Our empirical analysis applies these ideas at several points,
most prominently when we draw inferences about the nature of production from lawyers￿
earnings and organization, and when we develop a strategy for structural estimation.
In section II we propose a model of hierarchy, which is based on the equilibrium model of
knowledge hierarchies with heterogeneous agents in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
In this model, production involves the application of individuals￿time and knowledge
to problem-solving. Individuals have heterogeneous cognitive ability; some individuals
can learn to solve problems at lower cost than others. Individuals choose how much
knowledge to acquire and whether to work on their own or in hierarchical teams. When
individuals work in teams, some individuals may communicate their knowledge to others
￿thus organizing production hierarchically allows more talented individuals to leverage
their knowledge by applying it to others￿time. More knowledgeable managers must be
matched with more knowledgeable subordinates, as this allows agents to better leverage
their knowledge by avoiding dealing with the routine problems others could also solve.
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) show that equilibrium assignment in this type of
model is characterized by three properties: scale e⁄ects associated with managerial skill,
positive assortative matching, and strong strati￿cation by skill. That is, better man-
agers work with more and better workers, managers work with workers with dissimilar
skill levels, and the least skilled manager is more skilled than the most skilled worker.
These assignment patterns generate distinct earnings and organizational patterns. Scale
e⁄ects and positive assortative matching together imply that managerial earnings, worker
earnings, and the worker/manager ratio should be positively correlated; strong strati￿-
cation implies that managers earn more than workers, even when comparing managers
at ￿rms with low worker/manager ratios to workers at ￿rms with high worker/manager
ratios. We discuss how these implications di⁄er from those generated by other classes
of production functions (such as O-ring functions where skills are strictly and symmet-
rically complementary (as in Kremer (1993)), or those where skills are strict substitutes
(as discussed in Grossman and Maggi (2000)), and non-hierarchical production functions
where individuals￿skills are complements but a⁄ect production asymmetrically (Kremer
and Maskin (2004)).
In section IV, we examine lawyers￿earnings and organizational patterns, using data from
the 1992 Census of Services (see Section III for a description of the data). These data
1Rosen notes that ￿the ￿rm cannot be analyzed in isolation from other production units in the economy.
Rather, each person must be placed in his proper niche, and the marriage of personnel to positions and
to ￿rms must be addressed directly.￿(322)
2contain law-o¢ ce-level information about revenues, the number of partners, the number
of associates, and associate earnings. We use these data to infer how much partners
and associates earn at each o¢ ce. We examine earnings patterns and draw inferences
about the equilibrium assignment of lawyers to each other, to organizational positions,
and to ￿rms. Our evidence indicates that, consistent with positive sorting, higher-earning
partners work with higher-earning associates. Perhaps more surprisingly, higher-earning
associates work in o¢ ces with greater associate-partner ratios. These patterns are true
both within and across local geographic markets. We also ￿nd evidence consistent with
strong skill strati￿cation: controlling for their ￿eld of specialization, partners in o¢ ces
with the lowest partner-associate ratios earn more than associates in o¢ ces with the
highest partner-associate ratios. That is, the least-leveraged partners earn more than
associates do, even those associates who work at o¢ ces with high partner-associate ratios.
These empirical patterns are consistent with the equilibrium assignments generated by
our model.2
We then consider the implications of our model with respect to the equilibrium assign-
ment of individuals to markets of di⁄erent sizes. If increasing returns lead highly-skilled
managers to work in the largest markets, the equilibrium assignment patterns depicted
above imply a distinctive cross-market pattern in which the probability that an individ-
ual works in a large market rises, falls, then rises with their skill. This is because as
an individual￿ s skill increases, their comparative advantage changes from being a worker
supporting a highly-skilled, highly-leveraged manager (who works in a large market) to
being a low-leverage manager who works in a small market. We show evidence that sug-
gests such a pattern: the relationship between individual lawyers￿earnings and the size of
the local market in which they work is non-monotonic. When looking at local markets in
a given size range, earnings distributions among lawyers appear to be bimodal, with the
location of both modes in the earnings distributions increasing as one moves from smaller
to larger local markets. These spatial patterns are easily rationalized by production
functions such as those we propose that involve limited quality-quantity substitution in
individuals￿human capital, and in which cross-matching obtains in equilibrium.
Thus overall, we ￿nd a production function like the one we propose ￿ts reasonably the
main aspects of the data.
In section V, we move from testing to estimation, and propose an econometric frame-
work in which we can estimate this type of production function from equilibrium earnings
and organization data. This framework exploits close connections between equilibrium
assignment models and the hedonics literature. Our econometric framework exploits two
2See also Garicano and Hubbard (forthcoming) for empirical tests of Garicano (2000) that relate law
o¢ ces￿hierarchical structure to the degree to which lawyers ￿eld-specialize. Unlike this paper, our
previous work does not examine earnings or assignment patterns.
3crucial features of the model. First, leverage is a su¢ cient statistic for worker skill. Sec-
ond, the productivity of a hierarchical team, per unit of productive time, is determined
only by the manager￿ s skill. These two features allow us to avoid some of the main
di¢ culties involved in hedonic models. As a result, we can obtain consistent estimates of
the crucial parameter in our model: the time cost of team production. We show that we
can identify this parameter from the ratio between team average product and the mar-
ginal cost of leverage. This, in turn, allows us to recover the team production function
and generate counterfactuals that indicate what lawyers would produce and earn absent
hierarchical production.
We ￿nd that hierarchical production increases lawyers￿productivity substantially: it
increases output by at least 30%, relative to non-hierarchical production in which there is
no vertical specialization within o¢ ces. We also ￿nd that hierarchies expand substantially
earnings inequality, increasing the ratio between the 95th percentile and median earnings
among lawyers from 3.7 to 4.8, mostly by increasing the earnings of the very highest
percentile lawyers in business and litigation-related segments, and leaving relatively un-
a⁄ected the earnings of the less leveraged lawyers. Though these e⁄ects are substantial,
we believe them to be far smaller than in other sectors of the economy. We discuss the
source of these di⁄erences and what they may mean for production in the service sector
in the paper￿ s conclusion.
We see the contribution of the paper as methodological as well as substantive. Method-
ologically, we wish to reintroduce the idea that earnings patterns say a lot about the nature
of human-capital-intensive production and about the underlying reasons for industries￿
equilibrium organization. This idea has been underexploited, in part because of the lack
of data sets that contain not only information about individuals￿earnings, but also on
their position within their ￿rms￿organization and their ￿rms￿characteristics.3 To ex-
ploit these patterns requires combining equilibrium analysis with organizational models.
Evidence on who works with whom and in what capacity can be enormously informa-
tive, but inferences from such evidence must be based on equilibrium models since such
models allow assignments to be based on individuals￿comparative rather than absolute
advantage.
Before jumping to our analysis, a few caveats are in order. Our approach, which
emphasizes and exploits labor market equilibria, does not come for free. We largely
abstract from most of the incentive issues that dominate the organizational economics
literature, as well as many of the details of internal labor markets. We also must place
restrictions on agent heterogeneity so that our equilibrium does not involve sorting on
multiple dimensions. The returns to this approach are considerable, however, as it
3It might also re￿ ect an intellectual separation between the ￿elds of labor economics and industrial
organization that Rosen (1982) was trying to bridge.
4provides for a tractable equilibrium model from which we can estimate the impact of
organization (or, equivalently, the impact of vertical specialization) on lawyers￿output
and the distribution of lawyers￿earnings. In short, this approach allows us to develop a
￿rst estimate of the return to hierarchy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II proposes a model of problem-solving
hierarchies and discusses the general existing theoretical results on equilibrium assignment
under di⁄erent assumptions about production and about scale of operations e⁄ects. In
section III we describe our data. Section IV analyzes earnings patterns in legal services
in light of these models. Section V discusses and presents the estimates of our structural
model and analyzes how much hierarchical production a⁄ects lawyers￿output and the
earnings distribution among lawyers. Section VI concludes.
II. HIERARCHIES, ASSIGNMENT, AND HETEROGENEITY
II.1. A problem-solving hierarchy
We develop a simpli￿ed version of the model of hierarchy in Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006), with only two layers of hierarchy and exogenous knowledge. All agents
are endowed with a skill level z 2 [0;zmax] and with one unit of time. The population is
described by a given distribution of skill, G(z); with density function g (z). Production
involves the application of these agents￿time and knowledge to solving clients￿problems.
Skill is unidimensional and vertical; z can thus be thought of as an index that re￿ ects
the share of client problems that an agent can solve. Thus, more-skilled agents can
solve a greater share of these problems than less-skilled agents, and the problems that
a less-skilled agent can solve are a subset of those that a more-skilled agent can solve.
Throughout this paper, we normalize the skill units z to dollars, so that an agent with
skill z can solve problems with dollar value z: We will then think of z as the output an
agent can attain when working on his own.
Agents can either work on their own or form hierarchical teams. Hierarchical teams
are comprised of a manager with skill zm and n workers with skill zw:4 We assume
that managers can apply their knowledge toward problems that workers cannot solve
by themselves, but that managers must spend time communicating with the workers
when they do so. Less knowledgeable workers require more help per worker, and thus
the span of the manager, n, is limited by the knowledge of the workers through the
manager￿ s time constraint. This time constraint imposes that the workers￿skill, zw, and
the worker/manager ratio, n, are linked by a function of the form n(zw); with n0(zw) > 0:5
4Hierachical teams will be optimal when matching problems and knowledge is di¢ cult (see Garicano
2000).
5In Garicano￿ s original model, F(z) is the probability that an agent can solve a problem and (1￿F(z))
5The production function of a hierarchical team is given by:
y = zmf(n(zw))
This function has two terms: zm, the manager￿ s skill, and f(n(zw)), the amount of e⁄ective
time team members spend in direct production. The function f(n) is a mapping from the
team members￿time endowment (n+1) to actual productive time available. f(n) accounts
for the possibility that these two quantities should di⁄er if hierarchical production requires
agents to spend time communicating or coordinating. Throughout the rest of the paper,
we will assume that f(n) = (n+1)￿; so that n units of worker time and 1 unit of manager
time results in (n + 1)￿ units of time spent in production. We assume ￿ < 1, so that
hierarchical production is costly in terms of the time agents spend in production. The
speci￿cation implies that if an agent works on his own (n = 0), then f(0) = 1; individuals
working on their own do not incur communication or coordination costs.
The top part of Figure 1 depicts production under nonhierarchical production, in which
agents work on their own. The left side of this panel depicts the time and knowledge
of (n + 1) agents. The lines depict these agents￿time endowments, the shaded regions
depict these agents￿knowledge. n of these agents have knowledge zw, 1 has knowledge zm.
Assume that each of these agents confront a set of problems that vary in their di¢ culty,
and that each of these sets requires one unit of agent time to handle. These (n + 1) sets
of problems are depicted on the right. Under nonhierarchical production, each of these
agents simply handles the problems they themselves confront. Output of each of the
n lower-skilled agents would be zw and output of the higher-skilled agent would be zm.
Total output would be zm + nzw.
The bottom part of this Figure depicts hierarchical production. Total output is
zm(n + 1)￿, the product of the manager￿ s skill and the time the (n + 1) agents are able
to spend in production. Output per unit of productive time is improved, relative to
autarchic production, because problems are allocated to workers and managers according
to their comparative advantage; workers handle the easiest problems the group confronts,
while managers handle the hardest ones. This improvement is the bene￿t of hierarchical
production; the drawback is that hierarchical production involves a loss in time spent in
production.
We note here that this production function has several key elements. First, individuals
of di⁄erent skills are not perfect substitutes to one another; di¢ cult problems can only be
solved by highly-skilled agents. Second, managers￿and workers￿skills are complementary.
is the probability that he asks for help, and each time a worker asks for help costs the manager a share h
of this time endowment. Since a manager has 1 unit of time, the number of workers who may work under
this manager is given by n(zw) = 1=(h(1 ￿ F(zw))): For our empirical purpuses, the speci￿c relation
between n and zw is irrelevant, and we simply will write n(zw):
6Third, output is asymmetrically sensitive to managerial and worker skill; the asymmetric
sensitivity follows naturally from the fact that teams are formed by workers and a manager,
whose skill increases the productivity of all of the workers to which this skill is applied.
Last, and related, managers can exploit scale e⁄ects associated with their human capital.
II.2. Equilibrium
Obtaining an equilibrium in this economy implies solving a continuous assignment prob-
lem with two twists relative to standard assignment problems. First, who is assigned to
whom is not a given, but an equilibrium outcome. In standard assignment models this
identity is assumed. In contrast, here we are ￿marrying￿a mass of workers with a mass
of managers, where those roles and masses are not given by assumption. Second, agents
can decide not to be matched and instead produce on their own.6
To solve the assignment problem, note ￿rst that optimality requires positive sorting,
that is, workers with more knowledge must be assigned to managers with more knowledge.
The reason is that there is a complementarity between the knowledge of workers and
managers through the manager￿ s time constraint. A more knowledgeable manager will
spread his greater knowledge over a larger number of workers, and this requires workers
to be more knowledgeable so that each does not require as much help.7
To characterize the equilibrium in this economy, we need to describe three objects: ￿rst,
the allocation of agents to positions ￿workers, managers, and "unleveraged" individuals
who are neither managers nor workers; second, the team composition ￿i.e., the matching
between workers and managers and the number of workers per manager; and third, the
earnings function. All these objects form an equilibrium, where earnings are such that
agents do not want to switch either teams or positions.
The equilibrium is characterized by a pair of thresholds (z￿;z￿￿); such that all agents
with knowledge z < z￿ become workers, all agents with z > z￿￿ become managers, and
those in between are "unleveraged."
Then suppose a mass n of workers with knowledge zw and a mass 1 of managers with
knowledge zm are matched together in a team. For this to be an equilibrium it must
be the case that the assignment maximizes managerial rents, that is, that the manager
would not be better o⁄ matching with either less knowledgeable or more knowledgeable
workers. Manager￿ s rents are given by
R(zm) = max
zw
zmf(n(zw)) ￿ w(zw)n(zw) (1)
6We sketch only the equilibrium construction, see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) for the details.
7Formally, @2y=@zw@zm = n0(zw) > 0:
7It follows that a necessary condition for the assignment to be an equilibrium is that the
marginal bene￿t of worker skill equals its marginal cost. Since the bene￿t of workers￿
skill to managers is in allowing managers greater leverage, it is useful to write the ￿rst
order condition as:
zmf




In words, the marginal value of an increase in leverage is the skill of the manager times the
increase in e⁄ective time. The marginal cost is the extra wage cost w; plus the increase
in wages driven by the need for more skilled workers required by larger teams, w0:
A second equilibrium condition is the market clearing one. Given wages and earnings,











g (z)dz for all zw ￿ z
￿; (3)
where the matching function m(zw) denotes the knowledge of the manager assigned to
workers with knowledge zw. Since (3) holds for all zw ￿ z￿, we can di⁄erentiate with








which, together with m(0) = z￿￿ and m(z￿) = zmax; determines the equilibrium assignment
function m(z). The slope of the assignment function is given by the span of control ( a
smaller span means a higher slope, as a given quality interval of workers is mapped to a
larger interval of managers assigned to them) times the relative densities of workers and
managers.
Finally, the occupational choice of agents must be optimal. Given equilibrium assign-
ment and wage functions we can determine the earnings of a manager with skill zm;
R￿(zm). An agent can always choose to become self-employed and get z. Thus, equilib-
rium earnings are given by U(z) = maxfz;R￿(z);w(z)g: This implies that the marginal
worker (the most knowledgeable one) must be indi⁄erent between being a worker or being
self-employed, w(z￿) = z￿; and the marginal manager (the least knowledgeable one) must
be indi⁄erent between being a manager and being self-employed, R￿ (z￿￿) = z￿￿: These
conditions allow us to solve for the earnings and assignment functions. Figure 2 presents
a graphical depiction of the resulting earnings function.
We will use equation 2 and the equilibrium relationship between associates￿earnings
and n to estimate the production function But before doing this, we proceed to extract
some empirical implications from this model that we can take to the data.
8II.3. Implications for equilibrium assignment and earnings patterns
Equilibrium assignment under this "hierarchical production function" has three im-
portant characteristics, as discussed in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).8 First, it
involves positive sorting, which follows directly from the complementarity between man-
agerial and worker skill. Intuitively, a more highly-skilled manager has a comparative
advantage in working with more highly-skilled workers, since such workers allow the man-
agers to apply their human capital to a greater amount of worker time. Second, since
n0 > 0; positive sorting implies that there exist scale of operations e⁄ects: more highly-
skilled managers manage larger teams. Third, the equilibrium involves strong strati￿ca-
tion: that is, in equilibrium there must exist some skill level such that all agents of skill
below a given level are workers, and all of those above that level are working on their own
or are managers. This is less straightforward in this case, but an analogous proof to the
one in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) holds. Informally, the gist of the argument is
as follows. Suppose that in equilibrium a worker a with skill za
w were more skilled than a
manager in a di⁄erent team, b; with skill zb
m. This would mean that a problem faced by b
that b cannot solve remains unsolved, while some problems that a cannot solve are solved
(by a￿ s manager). But the fact that zb
m < za
w means that the problems a cannot solve
are harder, and thus less likely to be solved by any given agent than the problems that
b cannot solve. An assignment in which problems requiring more knowledge are solved
but problems requiring less knowledge are not is not an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006) Equilibrium assignment with hier-
archical production functions has the following properties.
1. Positive sorting. More highly skilled managers work with more highly skilled workers.
2. Scale of operations e⁄ects. More highly skilled managers manage larger teams of
workers.
3. Strati￿cation. The least skilled manager is more skilled than the most skilled worker.
These characteristics are summarized in Figure 2, which characterizes the resulting
agents￿equilibrium earnings as a function of their skill. Individuals below z￿ are associates,
while those above z￿￿ are leveraged partners. The slope of this earnings function increases
discontinuously at z￿￿; this re￿ ects the impact of leverage on partners￿earnings, which in
turn is determined by f(:):
8To be precise, all of these results are obtained in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) with a pro-
duction functions of the form zn,rather than zf(n), and with a speci￿c form for n(zw) given by the
(hierarchical) nature of problem solving. We argue below that analogous results hold in our case.
9II.4. Alternative production functions and equilibrium assignment patterns
The previous subsections brought us from a production function to implications about
equilibrium assignment. Such a path is a common theme of the literature on equilibrium
assignment: the nature of the interaction in production between individuals￿skills deter-
mines the equilibrium assignment of individuals in an economy to each other (and thus to
productive units) and to positions. This, in turn, shapes the equilibrium organization of
production and the distribution of earnings. Thus di⁄erent forms of production functions
result in di⁄erent implications for earnings and assignments. We discuss some alternative
production functions and assignment implications in what follows. Although we keep
the discussion quite informal and focus on presenting the ideas behind these results,9 the
reader should keep in mind an economy with a continuum of agent types and a type space
that is a compact subset of the real line, where there is a continuous probability distrib-
ution over types. This discussion points out how the assignment patterns generated by
our model summarized in Proposition 1 are distinct from those generated by production
functions contemplated elsewhere in the literature. Later we will examine earnings and
assignment patterns in the context of law ￿rms in light of this discussion.
Non-hierarchical production Production functions di⁄er in how agents￿skills inter-
act ￿in particular, whether production is supermodular or submodular in agents￿abilities
￿and whether production is symmetrically or asymmetrically sensitive to individuals￿
abilities.
First, consider production functions with symmetric complementarities (Becker (1981,
1993)), such as y = z1z2. These production functions capture situations where for
example all tasks have to be accomplished for success, and skill determines the probability
of success on a given task (Kremer (1993)). Individuals￿willingness to pay to be paired
with an individual with a given talent level is increasing with their own talent, and thus
these production functions produce self-matching or segregation in equilibrium ￿those
in each team have equal ability. This self-matching stands in contrast with the cross-
matching that obtains in our model.10
Second, consider production functions that are submodular in individuals￿abilities, so
9See Sattinger (1993) for a good review of the literature on this topic and Legros and Newman (2002)
for the formal exposition of a set of general conditions characterizing positive and negative assortative
matching in equilibrium.
10Note that equilibrium assignment between managers and workers in our model never involves self-
matching - a worker never has as much skill as his manager. To see this, note that an agent with skill
z who works on his own earns z: A team of n + 1 such agents working together in a hierarchy with one
acting as manager and n acting as workers earns zf(n(z)), which is less than they would earn if each
worked on its own, (n + 1)z: When workers are identical, the team produces less than all the workers
would produce on their own, and thus it is not formed. Equilibrium assignment therefore must involve
some cross-matching.
10that individuals￿abilities are substitutes. This would be the case, for example, if only
the best idea or most skillful execution matters; other ideas or e⁄orts turn out to be
redundant. These production functions imply negative assortative matching ￿the more
able the manager, the less able the workers (See Proposition 3 in Legros and Newman
(2002) for a precise statement of this result).11 This is unlike our model, in which there
is positive sorting in equilibrium.
Third, consider production functions that are supermodular in individuals￿abilities,
but in which production is asymmetrically sensitive to individuals￿abilities, such as the






with ￿ > 1=2, so that production is more sensitive to the ability of the individual assigned
task 1 than task 2. Kremer and Maskin show that equilibrium assignment may involve
either self-matching or cross-matching, depending on the support of the distribution of
skills, and in the cross-matching outcome strati￿cation obtains: all agents above a given
ability threshold work in task 1, and all agents below it work in task 2. The combination
of complementarity and asymmetry in Kremer and Maskin￿ s production function is also
present in our model, so it follows that it shares some of its most important implications:
positive sorting and strati￿cation. However, Kremer and Maskin￿ s analysis di⁄ers from
ours because their production function involves two agents. It therefore cannot generate
implications with respect to the match between individuals and worker/manager ratios.
In our model, asymmetric sensitivity arises precisely because of the way production can
be organized: one agent￿ s talent, the manager￿ s, can a⁄ect the productivity of all of those
with whom he or she works. This leads to an important implication that is not part of
Kremer and Maskin￿ s analysis: part 2 of Proposition 1, which concerns scale of operations
e⁄ects.
Hierarchical Production Scale e⁄ects associated with managers￿human capital is
not a novel concept. A long-standing literature, starting with Simon (1957), and includ-
ing papers by Mayer (1960), Lucas (1978), Calvo and Weillisz (1979), Rosen (1982) and
Waldman (1984), has proposed that the reason that the distribution of income is more
skewed than the underlying distribution of skills lies in how resources are allocated to
11Suppose, for example, that production requires two individuals, and output takes place if and only
if at least one individual knows the solution to a particular problem, and suppose that the probability
that individual i knows the solution is zi:Then output is given by the submodular production function
y = 1￿(1￿z1)(1￿z2). A production function like this was ￿rst suggested by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) in
the context of project screening within a "polyarchy:" a project is approved if at least one division head
likes it.
11individuals.12 In these models, higher-ability managers raise the productivity of the re-
sources they are assigned more than lower-ability managers. As a result, in equilibrium,
more able managers are allocated more resources, and this leads the marginal value of
their ability to increase faster than if they were working on their own.
Production functions in this literature have the generic structure:
y = zmf(n) (6)
where zm is managerial human capital and n is the manager￿ s span of control, which,
depending on the model, may be the number of workers (Lucas, 1978), e¢ ciency units of
labor, i.e., total units of skill managed (Rosen, 1982), or physical capital. In these models,
managerial human capital zm shifts up the marginal product of the workers or capital they
are assigned, but managers￿span of control is generally limited implicitly or explicitly by
managers￿time.
Equilibrium assignment patterns in these models share aspects of our model. In par-
ticular, they involve scale of operations e⁄ects: more skilled managers are assigned more
resources to manage in equilibrium. As a result, the distribution of earnings is more
skewed than the distribution of skills. However, this class of models has generally as-
sumed perfect substitutability among the resources managed by the manager, so that only
the quantity of resources, and not the quality of which they are composed, matters.13 This
assumption also characterizes the typical treatment of workers￿human capital in produc-
tion function estimation, which summarizes it in a single composite "labor" term. Absent
an element of imperfect substitutability between workers of di⁄erent skill, these models
do not allow for a full analysis of either the equilibrium assignment of individuals to each
other or of earnings distributions; if skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes,
in equilibrium managers should be indi⁄erent between working with a few relatively skilled
workers or many unskilled workers. Assignment patterns between individual managers
and workers would then be indeterminate. Our model allows for a more complete analysis
of assignment and earnings patterns because it combines imperfect substitutability of the
form in (5), with scale e⁄ects of the form in (6), and this completeness facilitates our
structural estimation below. Our estimation, unlike most production function estima-
tion, accounts explicitly for limited substitutability between the quantity and quality of
12See Gabaix and Landier (2006) for a modern application of this type of theory to trends in CEO pay.
13For example, in models where productive resources are human capital, either only the total number
of workers matters (as in Lucas (1978)) or workers of di⁄erent skill are perfect substitutes (as in Rosen
(1982)). In Waldman￿ s (1984) more general model, no restrictions on the interaction between managers
and workers skills are imposed, but that allows only to characterize the correlation between ability levels
and hierarchical position and the fact that the wage distribution is more skewed to the right than the
ability distribution. The speci￿c model he analyzes does not allow for complementarities between worker
and manager skill and as a result has equilibria with workers more skilled than managers.
12workers.
This type of production function is most applicable in human-capital-intensive indus-
tries, where the most important inputs are individuals￿skills and time and where organi-
zational structures are designed to exploit these inputs. It is thus natural to think that
optimizing the utilization of human capital is an important concern in the production of
legal services; we turn to an analysis of earnings patterns in this industry.
III. DATA
The data are from the 1992 Census of Services. Along with standard questions about
revenues, employment, and other economic variables, the Census asks a large sample of
law o¢ ces questions about the number of individuals in various occupational classes that
work at the o¢ ce and payroll by occupational class. For example, it asks o¢ ces to report
the number of partners or proprietors, the number of associate lawyers, and the number of
nonlawyers that work at the o¢ ce. It also asks payroll by occupational class: for example,
the total amount associate lawyers working at the o¢ ce are paid. These questions elicit
the key variables in our analysis. Other questions ask o¢ ces to report the number of
lawyers that specialize in each of 13 ￿elds of the law (e.g., corporate law, tax law, domestic
law) and the number of lawyers who work across multiple ￿elds. These variables allow
us to control for the ￿eld composition of lawyers at various points in our analysis.
These data have several aspects that lend themselves to an analysis of equilibrium
assignment. They cover an entire, well-de￿ned human-capital-intensive industry in which
organizational positions have a consistent ordering across ￿rms, and allow us to construct
estimates of individuals￿earnings at the organizational position*o¢ ce level at a large
number of ￿rms. This allows us to explore how individuals￿earnings are related to
others with whom they work, their organizational position, and characteristics of the ￿rm
and market in which they work. Data that allows one to connect individuals￿earnings
with ￿rm characteristics across ￿rms is not common, and it is even less common to be
able to connect earnings with individuals￿organizational position. These data have
shortcomings, however: whether they contain information about organizational positions
depends on ￿rms￿legal form of organization, they do not directly report partners￿earnings,
and at best they provide information on earnings at the organizational position*o¢ ce level
rather than the individual level. We next discuss these shortcomings and how we address
them.
Responses and Firms￿ Legal Form of Organization Responses to some of the
Census￿questions have di⁄erent meanings, depending on the o¢ ce￿ s legal form of organi-
zation. The reason for this is that all lawyers are legally considered associate lawyers at
13o¢ ces that are legally organized as ￿professional service organizations￿(PSOs) such as
limited liability corporations. This is true even though lawyers at these o¢ ces distinguish
among themselves in the same way they do at o¢ ces legally organized as partnerships:
some are partners and others are associates. The variables the Census collects thus di⁄er
between PSOs and partnerships.14
Table 1 summarizes these di⁄erences. The data report the number of lawyers (and non-
lawyers) regardless, but distinguish between partners and associates only at partnerships.
The data report payroll of all lawyers at PSOs (since all lawyers are legally associates),
but only the payroll of associate lawyers at partnerships. The data do not directly report
the earnings of partners at partnerships, since these individuals are legally owners rather
than employees; their earnings are not considered payroll. The data contain revenues, as
reported from tax forms, for all o¢ ces, but not non-payroll expenses ("overhead").
The data on partnerships are advantageous because they are disaggregated within es-
tablishments; they distinguish between partners and associates. This disaggregation is
important for our analysis, both because it allows us to examine the implications and
estimate parameters of the hierarchical production model described above and more gen-
erally because it brings the analysis closer to the individual level. However, the data on
partnerships do not directly report partners￿earnings. To use these observations, we must
therefore generate estimates of partners￿earnings based on the data we have at hand. We
next describe how we do so.
Estimating Partners￿Earnings Partnerships commonly pay out to partners their
earnings net of expenses during the year. Thus, earnings per partner at o¢ ce i, Ri, can
be depicted by the identity:
Ri = (TRi ￿ winipi ￿ xili ￿ ohi)=pi
where TRi is total revenues at o¢ ce i, wi is average associate earnings at o¢ ce i, ni is
associates per partner, pi is the number of partners, xi is non-lawyer earnings per lawyer,
li = pi(1 + ni) is the number of lawyers, and ohi is overhead. This can be rewritten as:
Ri + ohi=pi = (TRi ￿ winipi ￿ xili)=pi
The data on partnerships contain the variables on the right side of this expression.
Thus, we observe the sum of partners￿earnings and overhead. We do not observe Ri and
ohi separately for partnerships; our task is to distinguish between these.
14PSOs make up about one-third of the industry in terms of lawyers, o¢ ces, and revenues.
14The above identity also implies:
ohi = TRi ￿ (Ripi + winipi) ￿ xili
The observations of PSOs contain each of the three terms on the right hand side, and
thus allow us to infer overhead for each of these o¢ ces.
Our approach for estimating partners￿earnings is to use the data from the PSOs to
develop estimates of overhead for each of the partnerships in the data. By the identity
above, estimates of overhead expenses imply estimates of partners￿earnings.
The Census￿Operating Expenses Survey provides evidence on the nature of law o¢ ces￿
overhead expenses.15 A signi￿cant share of these expenses are closely connected to
payroll; these include "employers￿cost of fringe bene￿ts": the ￿rm￿ s contribution to Social
Security, health insurance, retirement plans, and so on. These expenses amount to about
15% of payroll in the aggregate; additional evidence from Altman Weil￿ s 1994 Survey of
Law Firm Economics indicates that this 15% ￿gure is consistent across ￿rms. Other
expenses are more closely associated with running the o¢ ce: for example, leasing and
rental payments (on average, about 23% of overhead), and o¢ ce supplies and phone and
communication expenses (combined, about 10%). Finally, lawyers sometimes contract
for expert services on behalf of their clients, such as when patent lawyers hire engineers
or antitrust lawyers hire economists. Lawyers often bill experts on behalf of their clients
in such situations, and the charges appear as "pass throughs" ￿both as revenues and
expenses ￿from their perspective. In general, some elements of overhead are closely
related to the location and employment size of the o¢ ce (e.g., rent), others are more
closely related to how much business takes place (e.g., communication, "pass-throughs").
This evidence shapes our speci￿cation below.
Overhead at PSOs We use the data from PSOs extensively to examine what a⁄ects
overhead, in light of our previous knowledge of the structure of law ￿rms￿costs. In
particular, we are mindful of the following:
￿ "Non-payroll fringe bene￿ts" are consistently about 15% of payroll.
￿ Operating expenses increase with the o¢ ce￿ s scale; some elements with the number
of people in the o¢ ce and some with the amount of business.
￿ Some operating expenses such as rent should be higher in larger markets.
￿ O¢ ces￿cost structure might di⁄er depending on whether they serve businesses or
individuals (e.g., the former might involve more travel or business development
15Bureau of the Census (1996).
15expenses). The relationship between overhead and revenues might vary across
￿elds because "pass-throughs" are more important in some than others (e.g., patent
law).
We incorporate the ￿rst of these by simply assuming that fringe bene￿ts are 15% of
payroll for all o¢ ces, which allows our data to be used to explain variation in oh￿
i =
TRi￿1:15￿[(Ripi+winipi)￿xili]. We specify oh￿
i as a function of market size, revenues,
and the number of individuals working at the o¢ ce ("employment"), interacting market
size and employment to allow for the fact that additional o¢ ce space may be more costly
in larger markets. Furthermore, we allow the relationship between revenues and overhead
to vary across ￿elds.
We report the coe¢ cient estimates from this speci￿cation in Table 2.16 We allow the
intercept term to vary with indicator variables that correspond to the employment size
of the county in which the o¢ ce is located, and include interactions between employment
and these market size measures. The coe¢ cient estimates imply that the ￿xed overhead
cost of a very small law o¢ ce is on the order of $28,500. The interactions suggest that the
overhead associated with each additional individual is about $2,900 in very small counties
but this tends to be much greater in very large markets. We allow the coe¢ cient on
revenues to enter quadratically and to di⁄er across ￿elds. The estimates indicate that
the relationship is concave for most ￿elds, and strongest for patent, banking, and real
estate law. The estimates imply that overhead increases by $0.10-$0.25 with each $1.00
increase in revenues for most o¢ ces in our sample.
The R-squared for this regression, 0.70, is high. We found that more detailed speci￿ca-
tions, including those that include county ￿xed e⁄ects instead of the market size dummies
and that interact ￿eld shares with the employment variables, increase the R-squared by
very small amounts and generate almost exactly the same distributions in lawyers￿earn-
ings as those reported later in this paper.17
Comparing Estimated and Actual Earnings Distributions A ￿rst step is to com-
pare distributions from actual data and the estimates using only the PSOs: if we apply
16We included [employment-2] rather than employment in these regressions. Our sample only contains
observations of o¢ ces with positive employment, thus the smallest o¢ ce in our sample has two individuals:
a lawyer plus a non-lawyer. This normalization allows us to interpret the intercepts in terms of the ￿xed
cost of operating a very small o¢ ce.
The error term in the OLS regression is heteroskedastic; the variance of the residual is higher for
higher-revenue o¢ ces. We therefore use a GLS estimator to correct for this. The ￿rst stage regresses
the logged square of the residual on a fourth-order polynomial of logged revenues. We use the predicted
values of this regression as weights in the regression we report here.
17This likely re￿ ects that (a) the cost of o¢ ce space varies little across most counties, and (b) the
relationship between operating expenses and employment ￿which largely re￿ ects costs associated with
o¢ ce space, furniture, computer equipment, etc. ￿indeed should not vary depending on the details of
what a law o¢ ce does.
16the procedure to the PSOs, do we obtain a distribution close to what we started from?
The left side of Table 3 reports the results from this exercise. We compute the distri-
bution of lawyers￿earnings across o¢ ces, weighting each o¢ ce by the number of lawyers,
among PSOs. The median is $96,000; the 10th and 90th percentiles are $48,000 and
$179,000, respectively. The second column reports these percentiles when using the pre-
dicted values generated by the overhead regression. The two distributions are extremely
similar at all of the quantiles. Our estimates match the mean by construction, but the
fact that they match the quantiles well implies that our speci￿cation is able to capture
much of the within- and across-market variation in overhead expenses among o¢ ces in
this sample.
The right side compares estimates of the (imputed) earnings distribution among lawyers
in partnerships and proprietorships with those generated from other Census data that
contain individual earnings data: the Census￿Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS).
The PUMS data contain individuals￿responses from the 1990 Census of Population.
We use the 5% State Sample. Among other things, the Census asks individuals their
occupation, the industry in which they work, their usual hours of work, the number
of weeks they worked in the previous year, and their business and salary income. We
extract observations of full-time lawyers working out of law o¢ ces.18 We convert all
dollar amounts to 1991 dollars to make them comparable to those reported in the Census
of Services data.
A drawback to the PUMS data is that the earnings data are top-coded. Individuals￿
business income is top-coded if it exceeds $90,000; their salary income is top-coded if it ex-
ceeds $140,000. Thus, earnings distributions derived from PUMS re￿ ect actual responses
only below $90,000, which is approximately $99,000 in 1991 dollars. About two-thirds of
lawyers in the PUMS have earnings less than this level.
The ￿rst column on the right side of the table reports quantiles of lawyers￿earnings
distribution generated from the PUMS data. We report these for the 10th-60th percentiles
because the earnings data are top-coded above these levels. The median lawyer in our
PUMS subsample earned $71,442.
The second column reports estimates derived from the partnerships and proprietorships
in our Census data, using estimates of overhead generated from the speci￿cation in Table
3. The distribution generated by this method tracks that generated by the PUMS data
fairly closely, though the estimates are consistently $4,000-$8,000 higher than the PUMS
quantiles in the middle of the distribution. This comparison suggests that our estimates
of partner pay might be somewhat high. Our main analysis will revolve around how much
18We extract observations of lawyers who worked out of law o¢ ces (rather than as judges or as in-house
counsel), and eliminate those reporting that they were not in the labor force, whose usual hours were
less than 40 hours per week, and who worked fewer than 46 weeks during the previous year. We also
eliminate individuals younger than 25 or older than 70 years.
17lower partner pay would be, absent hierarchical production: the di⁄erence between our
estimates of partner pay and a counterfactual. The counterfactuals we present are just
transformations of estimated partner pay, so if our estimate of partner pay is somewhat
high, so will be the counterfactual. Our estimate of the di⁄erence between the two will
be a⁄ected far less.
Aggregation of Individuals￿Earnings Our data do not allow us to distinguish among
associates or among partners who work at the same o¢ ce. This aspect of our data limits
our analysis of equilibrium assignment patterns: we cannot examine the matching among
partners and among associates. In other work, we ￿nd evidence suggestive of positive
assortative matching across ￿rms within these organizational positions. In Garicano
and Hubbard (2005), we use data from the "blue page" listings of law o¢ ces throughout
Texas from the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers, and show that partners work
disproportionately with other partners who obtained their degree at a similarly-ranked
law school, and with other partners with similar experience levels. Similar patterns hold
for associates.
Our discussions of earnings patterns and what they imply about the nature of human-
capital-intensive production will downplay assortative matching among partners and among
associates, simply because we cannot investigate it empirically here. We suspect that
there is positive assortative matching within organizational positions, and that it might
take the form of self-matching, but further research with individual-level earnings data is
necessary to determine whether this is the case. Such research would lend further insights
on equilibrium assignment and the nature of human￿ capital-intensive production in this
context.
Our analysis will also tend to understate earnings heterogeneity across lawyers, because
at best we can examine earnings at the organizational position*o¢ ce level rather than
at the individual level. Although most of the earnings heterogeneity among partners (or
among associates) is across o¢ ces rather than within o¢ ces, there is sometimes quite a
bit of within-o¢ ce heterogeneity, especially at very large o¢ ces where there are di⁄erent
tiers of partners.19 This would lead us to understate the very highest quantiles when
we construct earnings distributions. However, Census disclosure restrictions constrain
what we can report, and we do not report any quantiles above the 95th percentile for this
reason. We therefore do not think this issue has a large impact on the results we present
and discuss below.
19It should be noted, however, that multiple tiers of partners is currently only common among very
large ￿rms, and in 1992, the time of our data, it was much less common than it is now.
18Some Basic Facts From Our Sample Before moving to our ￿rst set of results, we
report several facts from the partnerships and proprietorships that make up the sample
that we use hereafter (N=9283). As reported in Table 3, median earnings across all
lawyers in this sample are $77,000. The 25th and 75th percentiles are $44,000 and
$141,000, respectively. The 95th percentile is about $350,000; there were about 435,000
privately-practicing lawyers in the U.S. in 1991, so this represents the earnings of roughly
the 20,000th-ranked lawyer. About 40% of lawyers are associates, 25% are unleveraged
partners (partners in o¢ ces with no associates), and 35% are leveraged partners. Among
the latter, less than one-half work in o¢ ces with an associate-partner ratio greater than
one.
Much of the analysis in Section V will be conducted from the perspective of partners￿
optimal choice of leverage; it is thus useful to report some statistics from the perspective
of the average partner in our sample. The ￿rst column in Table 4 reports that average
revenues per partner were $361,000, and average partner pay was $150,000. On average,
partners had 0.6 associates, to whom they paid $36,000. The average partner worked
in an o¢ ce with 15 partners. In light of important ways in this industry are segmented
(see Garicano and Hubbard (2003)), we classify o¢ ces in the following way. We de￿ne
"litigation" o¢ ces as those with at least one lawyer specializing in a litigation-intensive
￿eld (negligence, insurance), and classify the remainder as "business, non-litigation" and
"individual, non-litigation" depending on whether the o¢ ce￿ s primary source of revenues
is from businesses or individual clients. Table 4 indicates that the partners in our sample
are evenly distributed across these three classes of o¢ ces.
The second and third columns, which report these averages separately according to
whether o¢ ces have at least one associate, indicate that the averages in the ￿rst column
mask a lot of variation in our sample. O¢ ces with at least one associate are much
larger in terms of the number of partners than those with no associates. Revenues per
partner and partner pay are much higher as well. The cross-segment distribution di⁄ers
as well; zero-associate o¢ ces are disproportionately in the "individual, non-litigation"
segment. Our empirical analysis will revolve around relationships between earnings and
o¢ ces￿hierarchical organization; this table highlights the importance of accounting for
di⁄erences in o¢ ces￿scale and lawyers￿￿elds (or their o¢ ce￿ s segment), both of which are
correlated with both lawyers￿earnings and hierarchical structure.
IV. EARNINGS PATTERNS AND HIERARCHICAL PRODUCTION
We next test the hypotheses derived from the model (Proposition 1); this tees up
the structural estimation to follow, which takes the model￿ s assumptions as maintained.
Some of the hypotheses are intuitive, and can be generated by a broad class of production
19functions (e.g., positive correlation between partner and associate earnings). Others are
less obvious, such as the correlation between associate earnings and the associate/partner
ratio and strong occupational strati￿cation in earnings. We proceed in what follows from
the weaker to the more powerful tests.
Associates and Partners￿Earnings Are Positively Correlated. Our ￿rst evidence
comes from simple regressions of average associate earnings within an o¢ ce on average
partner earnings within an o¢ ce, using o¢ ces with at least one associate. Results are in
Table 5. Panel A reports the coe¢ cient on ln(partner earnings) in ￿ve regressions. In the
￿rst, there are no controls. The coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant. The point estimate of
0.326 indicates that, on average, associate earnings are 33% higher where average partner
earnings are 100% higher. The second column includes a vector of ￿eld controls; this vector
includes the share of lawyers in the o¢ ce that specialize in each of 13 ￿elds (e.g., corporate
law, probate law). The third and fourth control for geographic market di⁄erences. In
the third, we include a vector of ￿ve dummies that correspond to the employment size
of the county in which the o¢ ce is located;20 in the fourth, we instead include county
￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿fth column controls for the o¢ ce￿ s scale in terms of partners by
including partners, partners2, and partners3. The coe¢ cient on ln(partner earnings)
decreases when including the ￿eld and market controls, indicating that part of the raw
correlation captures cross-￿eld and cross-market di⁄erences in average earnings. The
result in the fourth column, which includes county ￿xed e⁄ects, indicates that associates￿
and partners￿earnings are positively correlated within as well as between markets. The
coe¢ cient decreases only slightly when we control for the o¢ ce￿ s scale in terms of partners,
indicating that the correlation between partner and associate earnings does not re￿ ect that
both partners and associates tend to earn more in o¢ ces with more partners. Throughout,
the coe¢ cient on ln(partner earnings) remains positive and signi￿cant; the coe¢ cient in
the last column indicates that on average, associate pay is 17% higher at o¢ ces where
partner pay is twice as high.
We have run analogous speci￿cations using various subsamples of the data. We ran
them separately for "business" and "individual" o¢ ces depending on whether 50% of
revenues come from clients who are businesses or individuals. We ran "within market"
speci￿cations, running them separately for o¢ ces in several very large counties (Manhat-
tan, Los Angeles County, etc.). Finally, we conducted "within ￿eld" speci￿cations by
using only o¢ ces where all lawyers work in a particular ￿eld (e.g., patent law). We ￿nd
that the results we report above are robust: partner and associate earnings are positively
correlated in these speci￿cations as well.
20These correspond to the following employment size categories: 20,000-100,000, 100,000-200,000,
200,000-400,000, 400,000-1,000,000, and greater than 1,000,000.
20These results show strong evidence that associate earnings are higher at o¢ ces where
partner earnings are higher. While they need not necessarily re￿ ect that associates￿and
partners￿abilities are positively correlated ￿a positive correlation in earnings could be
driven by o¢ ce-level demand shocks (everyone receives a bonus in good years) ￿they
are consistent with production functions that generate positive assortative matching in
equilibrium. Such functions include those in which individuals￿skills are complements,
but not those in which they are substitutes.
Associates￿and Partners￿Earnings Are Positively Correlated with Associate-
Partner Ratios. We next investigate whether associates￿and partners￿earnings are
higher at o¢ ces where the associate/partner ratio is higher. Panel B in Table 5 reports
results from speci￿cations where we regress ln(partner earnings) on ln(associates/partner).
In each of the speci￿cations, the coe¢ cient on ln(associates/partner) is positive and sig-
ni￿cant. In Panel C, the dependent variable is instead ln(associate earnings). Once again,
the point estimates are positive and signi￿cant.21 Using the results from the last column
and comparing o¢ ces where one has an associate/partner ratio that is twice as high as
the other, average partner pay is 34% higher and average associate pay is 11% higher at
the o¢ ce with the higher associate/partner ratio. The elasticity between partner earnings
and the associate/partner ratio is about three times that between associate earnings and
the associate/partner ratio.
Our results provide evidence consistent with a key implication of hierarchical production
functions: that comparing earnings among individuals who are at the same hierarchical
rank, those who work in groups with more lower-level individuals per upper-level individ-
ual earn more. This result also shows that the correlation between associate and partner
earnings reported in the previous subsection do not just re￿ ect transitory earnings shocks,
unless these shocks also lead associate/partner ratios to change.
Strati￿cation. An important aspect of equilibrium assignment under our model is that
it should lead to strati￿cation. In this context, this implies that all associates should be
less able than any partner. The evidence above suggests that more able associates work in
o¢ ces with higher associate/partner ratios, as do more able partners. Thus, in this con-
text strati￿cation requires in particular that partners in o¢ ces with low associate/partner
ratios have higher ability than associates in o¢ ces with high associate/partner ratios.
We examine this by investigating the ordering of lawyers￿earnings. We classify lawyers
according to whether they are partners or associates, and the associate/partner ratio of
their o¢ ce. Regarding the latter, we create four categories: less than 0.5, between 0.5
21We have run analogous speci￿cations using the subsamples we discuss in the previous subsection and
￿nd very similar results.
21and 1.0, between 1.0 and 2.0, and greater than 2.0. This divides lawyers into eight
categories. We refer to the associate categories as A1-A4, and the partner categories as
P1-P4. We then examine the ordering of lawyers￿earnings across these categories. An
ordering corresponding to occupational strati￿cation would be: A1, A2, A3, A4, P1, P2,
P3, P4. An ordering corresponding to self-matching would be: A1, P1, A2, P2, A3, P3,
A4, P4.
Our speci￿cations take the form of ordered logits, where:
P1 =1 ￿ ￿(￿wi ￿ ￿1)
Pj =￿(￿wi ￿ ￿j￿1) ￿ ￿(￿wi ￿ ￿j); j = 2;:::;N ￿ 1
PN =￿(￿wi ￿ ￿N)
Pj is the probability that lawyer i is in position j in the speci￿ed ordering. For the
occupational strati￿cation ordering, position 1 is A1, position 2 is A2, and so on. These
probabilities are a function of lawyer i￿ s earnings wi, and thresholds ￿j. We estimate this
model using di⁄erent orderings, and compare orderings￿explanatory power using Vuong￿ s
(1989) non-nested hypothesis test.
Our earnings data are at the level of individuals who work at the same o¢ ce and organi-
zational position; at o¢ ces with both partners and associates, there are two observations.
We weight each observation by the number of lawyers the observation represents. We let
the thresholds ￿j vary across ￿elds and counties, allowing them to be linear functions of
the share of lawyers in the o¢ ce who are in each of the 13 ￿elds in our data, and a vector
of county size dummies. This allows relationships between earnings and organizational
position to vary across ￿elds and across markets. We impose the constraint ￿j > ￿j￿1 so
the model is well-de￿ned.
Table 6 reports Vuong test statistics when comparing the occupational strati￿cation
speci￿cation with other speci￿cations. Under the null hypothesis that speci￿cations ￿t
the data equally well, the Vuong test statistic is distributed N(0,1). Like the previous two
subsections, in Panel A we use only data from o¢ ces with at least one associate. From
the log-likelihood values, the occupational strati￿cation speci￿cation ￿ts the data better
than that in the second row, in which associates at o¢ ces with high associate/partner
ratios "outrank" partners at o¢ ces with low associate/partner ratios. The Vuong test
statistic of 8.44 is easily greater than the critical value of 1.96 for a size 0.05 test, indicating
that one can reject the null that the speci￿cations ￿t the data equally well in favor of
the alternative that the occupational strati￿cation speci￿cation ￿ts better. This test
re￿ ects that, controlling for market size and lawyers￿￿elds, associates at o¢ ces where the
associate/partner ratio is high earn less than partners at o¢ ces where this ratio is low.
22Associates not only tend to earn less than partners in their o¢ ce, but also than partners
more generally.
The ￿nal row of the Panel reports test statistics when comparing the occupational
strati￿cation speci￿cation with a speci￿cation that uses the "self-matching" ordering.
The results indicate that the former ￿ts the data signi￿cantly better than the latter,
which is not a surprise given the results reported in the previous row.
While some of these patterns may re￿ ect aspects of the labor market not captured by
our model,22 the broad consistency of these earnings patterns with Proposition 1 provides
some assurance as we move away from testing the model￿ s hypotheses to estimating its
parameters structurally.
Panel B expands the analysis by including partners at o¢ ces with no associates ￿"un-
leveraged partners" ￿in the analysis for the ￿rst time. Occupational strati￿cation implies
that such individuals should rank above all associates but beneath all other partners. We
examine this by comparing this to other orderings. The results using all counties indicate
that the strati￿cation speci￿cation does not ￿t best; speci￿cations in which unleveraged
partners are outranked by some classes of associates ￿t signi￿cantly better. The rest of
the table explores this further by splitting the sample according to whether the employ-
ment size of the county is less than 400,000.23 The results indicate that the occupational
strati￿cation ordering ￿ts best for lawyers in the small and medium sized counties (though
not statistically signi￿cantly better than one of the other orderings), but ￿ts poorly for
lawyers in the largest ones. What this re￿ ects is that the distribution of earnings among
unleveraged partners in these large counties has a long lower tail. One possible expla-
nation for this is that the small share of lawyers in these counties that work on their
own are disproportionately working part-time, but absent data on hours this is only a
conjecture. In any case, there is no evidence that the strati￿cation result extends to
unleveraged partners in the nation￿ s largest counties.
Earnings Distributions and Local Market Size. Before moving to estimation, we
report an additional piece of evidence relevant to assignment patterns: the distribution of
lawyers￿earnings across di⁄erently-sized local markets. The assignment of individuals to
markets may re￿ ect the equilibrium assignment of individuals to each other. One possible
pattern in the assignment of individuals to markets is a simple one implied by Rosen
(1981): in situations where there is limited substitution between the quality and quantity
of human capital, "superstar e⁄ects" could lead skill and the size of the market in which
22For example, dynamic aspects may lead associates￿equilibrium wages to be lower than they would
be in a static equilibrium. If so, this would bias the results toward ￿nding strati￿cation and hence lower
the power of this test.
23As noted in the table, only about 40 counties were above this threshold as of 1992. Counties near
this level include Hillsborough County, FL (Tampa) and Orange County, FL (Orlando).
23they work to be positively associated throughout their respective domains.24 However, if
the equilibrium assignment of individuals to each other involves cross-matching, like in our
model, one would not expect such a pattern. Individuals who tend to work in the largest
markets would include not only those with the greatest skill, but also individuals in the
middle of the skill distribution whose comparative advantage is working under experts.
Under cross-matching, skill and market size would not be positively associated throughout
their respective domains, even in the presence of "superstar e⁄ects." At some point in
the skill distribution, as an individual￿ s skill increases, their comparative advantage would
change from being a worker supporting a highly-skilled, highly-leveraged manager (who
works in a large market) to being a low-leverage manager who works in a small market.
When the equilibrium assignment of individuals to each other involves cross-matching,
this could lead the relationship between individuals￿skill and the size of the market in
which they work to be non-monotonic.
Figure 3 depicts how the earnings distribution across lawyers varies with market size.
We construct the Figure in the following way. We ￿rst compute earnings deciles across
our entire sample, and classify lawyers according to the decile in which they fall. We
then classify lawyers according to the employment size of the county in which they work.
We then construct histograms that characterize the distribution of lawyers across earning
deciles, within each of the six market size categories. We show these distributions across
earnings deciles rather than earnings because it provides a useful benchmark: if the
earnings distribution is the same across markets, then the histograms would depict a
uniform distribution within each market size category. Departures from uniform indicate
earnings ranges in which lawyers are over- and under-represented within these market
size categories. Actual earnings distributions are highly positively skewed; the fact that
earnings ranges are much wider in the upper than lower deciles is a manifestation of this
skewness.
This Figure shows an interesting pattern. Although higher-earning lawyers tend to
work in larger markets, earnings and market size do not appear to be positively associated
throughout their domains. Within market size categories, the earnings distributions tend
to be bimodal, with each of the modes increasing as market size increases; there is a lower
hump that moves from the 1st to the 7th decile, and an upper hump that moves from the
8th to the 10th decile as one moves from the upper to the lower panels. In Appendix A
we discuss and report a regression version of this Figure that controls for lawyers￿￿elds.
The evidence is similar.
In closing this section, we note that the cross-matching implied by hierarchical produc-
24Rosen writes that an important implication of his analysis is that "it is monetarily advantageous to
work in a larger overall market; and it is increasingly advantageous the more talented one is...the best
doctors, lawyers, and professional athletes should be found in the largest cities." (1981:855)
24tion functions implies other interesting non-monotonicities. For example, it implies that
as individuals￿talent increases, neither the worker/manager ratio nor the talent level (as
proxied by the skill of the most able member) of the group in which they work increase
monotonically, even though such production functions imply that worker skill, manage-
rial skill, and the number of workers per manager are strictly complementary. This is
because individuals￿assignment to positions changes at some point as their skill increases
￿they change from being a worker to being a manager ￿and when this happens, their
equilibrium assignment to each other changes dramatically. Individuals go from working
with people at the top of the skill distribution to working with people at the bottom of
the skill distribution.25 We think these non-monotonicities could lend interesting insights
into individuals￿career progressions in some contexts, and one could test for them using
longitudinal data that follows individuals over time. We also note that these sorts of
non-monotonicities follow straightforwardly from the principle of comparative advantage,
but are only evident when one combines analysis of the production function with an
equilibrium model.
V. STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION
The previous section provided evidence of earnings patterns that are largely consistent
with the equilibrium assignment patterns implied by our model. With this in hand, we
now lean more heavily on the model, using it as a maintained assumption to estimate the
parameters of our production function structurally. We will then use these parameter
estimates to infer the return to hierarchy: how much does lawyers￿ability to organize
production hierarchically, as in Figure 1, increase lawyers￿productivity and how does it
a⁄ect the distribution of earnings across lawyers? How much of earnings heterogeneity
re￿ ects this versus skill di⁄erences?
We start the section with a discussion of the econometric issues involving hedonic
estimation of the model developed in Section II. We then specify our empirical model.
V.1. Preliminaries: Estimation Issues and Hedonics
In our context, the equilibrium assignment depicted in Section II is the result of lawyers
choosing with whom to work, given their skill z. The equilibrium earnings of a lawyer




￿ ￿ w(zw)n(zw) (7)
25From these individuals￿perspective, this might involve the end of their apprenticeship; our analysis
depicts the conditions in which apprenticeships are an equilibrium outcome.
25where zm is the partner￿ s skill and zw is this partner￿ s associates￿skill.
Setting aside the endogenous matching between agents and positions, the problem these
lawyers face, and the competitive equilibrium that arises, is analogous to that analyzed
in the hedonics literature starting with Rosen (1974). Heterogeneous managers choose
among workers of di⁄erent skills in a competitive labor market. The section of the earnings
function plotted in Figure 2 that lies below z￿, which corresponds to w(z), is interpretable
as a hedonic wage surface that relates the wage associates receive to their ability. As
in Rosen (1974), this surface re￿ ects a competitive equilibrium in which heterogeneous
suppliers (associates) match with heterogeneous buyers (partners). We use the properties
of this equilibrium to estimate ￿. Once ￿ is known, we can then compute what earnings
distributions would look like and how much production would be lost, absent hierarchical
production.
In Figure 4, we recast this section of Figure 2 in terms of the hedonics literature.
De￿ne ’(z;zm;￿;R) = zm(n(z) + 1)￿ ￿ R as a partner￿ s bid curve; this is a partner
with skill zm￿ s willingness to pay for an associate with skill z, at a given level of partner
earnings R. This bid curve is analogous to a consumer￿ s expenditure function. In the
competitive equilibrium depicted in Figure 2, the surface w(z) is the locus of tangency
points between heterogeneous partners￿bid curves and heterogeneous associates￿o⁄er
curves, which are analogously de￿ned. In equilibrium, ’0(z;zm;￿;R) = w0(z); partners￿
marginal willingness to pay for skill is equal to the marginal price of skill. We depict
two bid curves for lower and higher-skilled managers in Figure 4. In equilibrium, both
of these curves are tangent to the wage-skill surface.
The usual approach in the hedonic literature is to ￿rst estimate the function w(z) and
then use the ￿rst order conditions ’0(z;zm;￿;R) = w0(z) to estimate the parameters
of the production function. In our context, this would mean ￿nding a proxy for skill
(e.g. education or experience) and then proceeding with the estimation as if it were
z: We cannot do this in our context because we observe none of the standard proxies
of human capital such as education or experience. But even if we did observe such
variables, this method would su⁄er from a well-known problem. Although we would
not observe skill perfectly, market participants would. This would imply that agents
sort on variables we would not directly observe. In terms of the econometrics, this
would lead to biased estimates of the parameters of interest. Measurement error in the
key independent variable in our ￿rst-stage regression, skill, would lead us to incorrectly
estimate the marginal price of skill, and this in turn would contaminate our estimate of
￿.
However, a key property of the labor market equilibrium in our model not only makes
it feasible to estimate such a model using our data, but also substantially limits the
problem of unobserved skill. This key property is that n(z) is invertible: n, the number of
26associates per partner, increases monotonically with associate skill; thus, n is a su¢ cient
statistic for associate skill. In terms of the hedonics, this allows us to reformulate the
problem in terms of the supply and demand for leverage rather than the supply and
demand for skill.
We depict this in Figure 5. The vertical axis, P(n) = w(n)n, is the price of leverage
faced by a manager. A manager￿ s bid curve ’(n;zm;￿;R) is now stated in terms of
his willingness to pay for leverage rather than skill. Writing the bid curves in terms of
leverage rather than skill a⁄ords two advantages. First, n is a variable we observe directly
in the data ￿it is the number of associates per partner. Second, as long as there continues
to be unidimensional sorting on skill, there is now no problem associated with sorting on
unobservables ￿we observe a su¢ cient statistic, n, which summarizes all relevant aspects
of skill, including both that which is captured in usual proxies and that which is not.26
The invertibility property means that the quantities n and w0(n) summarize a lot of
information in equilibrium. n is not only the number of associates per partner, but is also
an error-free index of associates￿skill.27 Likewise w0(n) is not only the marginal price of
leverage, but is also a monotonic transformation of the marginal price of skill.
Formally, the transformation allows us to write the ￿rst order condition in Section II,
equation (2), for the worker￿ s wages,
zmf




in terms of n as:
zmf
0(n) = w(n) + w
0 (n)n (9)
Recasting the problem in this way is particularly bene￿cial because our data contain
more information than the usual data used in a hedonic estimation exercise, and this sub-
stantially mitigates the usual identi￿cation problems that arise in the hedonics literature.
(See the discussions in Epple (1987) and Bajari and Benkard (2006).) Figure 6 depicts
the marginal price schedule and the marginal bene￿t curves (the ￿rst derivative of the
bid curves) that correspond to what we depict in Figure 5. The standard identi￿cation
problem in hedonic studies is that one observes a locus of equilibrium marginal prices
and quantities, but this alone is not su¢ cient to trace out the slopes of the marginal
26Our exploitation of the invertibility of w(n) is similar to Olley and Pakes￿(1995) use of the invertibility
of the investment function in productivity estimation. In both cases, the idea is that if theory implies that
an agent￿ s decision variable increases monotonically with an unobserved variable, an arbitrary increasing
function of the decision variable substitutes for the unobserved variable.
27Note that this is true under a wide variety of additional assumptions that might change the wage
schedule or the match between associates and partners, but not the invertibility of w(n). For example,
if more skilled associates are willing to work for less for more skilled partners, n would continue to be a
su¢ cient statistic for associate skill, since this would merely reinforce positive sorting.
27bene￿t curves ￿and thus estimate the parameters of the production function. One gen-
erally needs supply-side shifters of P 0(n) to trace these out, but it is generally very hard
to ￿nd shifters of P 0(n) that, in equilibrium, are independent of the demand schedules
’0(n;zm;￿;R). Our data, however, contain information on R￿, partners￿equilibrium earn-
ings. This additional information allows us to determine whether these marginal bene￿t
curves are steep or ￿ at, because it allows us to compare the marginal to the average
bene￿ts of leverage; if the marginal and average bene￿ts are equal, this implies that the
marginal bene￿t curve is ￿ at. We can thus estimate the parameters of interest without
the supply-side shifters usually needed in hedonic estimation.
We next specify the empirical model. The fact that n is a su¢ cient statistic for asso-
ciate skill is valuable for the reasons we describe above, but presents a small challenge in
speci￿cation, since it eliminates an important reason why the data will not ￿t the model
exactly. The theoretical model in Section II implies that both partners￿earnings and
associates￿earnings are deterministic functions of n, but we must account for the fact
that this will not be true in the data. The stochastic elements of our model aim to relax
the deterministic relationships between earnings and skill in the theoretical model, while
maintaining the deterministic relationships between skill and n that give rise to invertibil-
ity. This requires assumptions on these stochastic elements that preserve unidimensional
sorting. These assumptions restrict the individuals in our model to be unidimensional,
fully characterized by a single parameter z that indexes their skill.
V.2. Empirical Model
The timing of the model follows. First, partners choose the number of associates they
work with to maximize expected earnings, subject to the wage-leverage surface they face.
Partners￿uncertainty at this point in time is over the demand they will receive for their
services. Second, uncertainty, and partners￿earnings, are realized.28
The Wage-Leverage Surface.￿
We assume throughout that, within a particular labor market, wi(n) = w(n) + ￿i:
the wage-leverage (or, equivalently, wage-skill) surface faced by partners at o¢ ce i is
the market wage-leverage surface plus some random variable ￿i, which we think of as
a compensating di⁄erential that accounts for di⁄erences in working conditions, and any
other factor that would shift associates￿o⁄er curves for working at o¢ ce i. This random
element is assumed to be attached to the o¢ ce and, conditional on n, a⁄ect the wage
level but not the marginal price of leverage. One implication of this is that ￿i shifts all
28This timing assumption implies that human capital here, much like physical capital in much of the
productivity literature, is ￿xed in the short run ￿￿rms cannot adjust this in response to demand shocks.
We view this as reasonable in this context, in which there is a distinct hiring season for associates.
28associates￿o⁄er curves up or down equally.29
We specify the market wage-leverage surface as a polynomial in n, controls for the ￿eld
composition of lawyers in o¢ ce i, and a full set of county ￿xed e⁄ects. In practice,
we found little additional explanatory power when adding terms in n beyond quadratic.
Suppressing the controls, the ￿rst stage regression assumes:
w(n) = ￿0 + ￿1n + ￿2n
2 (10)
Thus the marginal wage is:
w
0
i(n) = ￿1 + 2￿2n
We therefore estimate the wage-leverage surface by regressing average associate earnings
at o¢ ce i on a quadratic in the associate/partner ratio at the o¢ ce and a set of the above
controls. The coe¢ cients on n allow us to construct an estimate of the marginal price
of leverage, w0
i(n), for partners at each o¢ ce. We allow w(n) to di⁄er depending on
whether the o¢ ce is a "litigation," "business, non-litigation," or an "individual, non-
litigation" o¢ ce; allowing w(n) to di⁄er in this way accounts for the possibility that labor
markets for lawyers are segmented along these lines.
Partners￿Bid Curves.￿
Let Ri index a partner￿ s earnings in o¢ ce i, wi represent an associate￿ s pay in o¢ ce i,
and ni equal associates per partner, or leverage, at o¢ ce i. We assume that partners in
the same o¢ ce are similarly-skilled. A partner￿ s earnings in o¢ ce i are then given by:
Ri(zmi;n) = b zmi(ni + 1)
￿ ￿ wi(ni)ni ￿ ci(ni) (11)
= "izmi(ni + 1)
￿ ￿ wi(ni)ni ￿ ci(ni)
where b zmi = "izmi, zmi is the partner￿ s skill, and (ni + 1)￿ is the e⁄ective team time.
This function has two di⁄erences with the objective function in Section II; ￿rst, we
account for the fact that production involves factors other than lawyers with the term
ci(ni). As discussed in Section III, these factors include nonlawyers and overhead. Second,
we introduce "i, an o¢ ce level i.i.d term with E("i) = 1, to account for the fact that an
o¢ ce￿ s revenues is not a deterministic function of zmi and ni. We envision this as an o¢ ce-
level demand shock that re￿ ects that clients￿demands for legal services are stochastic,
and this leads to uncertainty about the number of hours lawyers bill during the year, but
there may be other interpretations of this term. In any case, these shocks are realized
29This implies that the slope of the wage-leverage surface for a given n is the same for all partners; we
discuss the implications of this below in the next subsection.
29only after organizational decisions are made, and thus a⁄ect partners￿earnings but not
the organizational equilibrium.
Recall that ￿ is the elasticity of e⁄ective time with respect to the size of the team. If
￿ = 1, there are constant returns, and adding associates does not diminish the e⁄ective
time per lawyer. If ￿ < 1, adding associates does so. ￿ is a measure of hierarchies￿
coordination costs, and is the parameter of interest in estimation; if this is known, then
we can use partners￿earnings equation (11) to back out Ri(zmi;0) and b zmi, what the
earnings and revenues, respectively, of a partner at o¢ ce i would be, if unleveraged. This,
in turn, allows us to infer how much hierarchical production a⁄ects productivity ￿the
gains to vertical specialization ￿and the distribution of earnings across lawyers.
Partner i￿ s problem is:
maxE(Ri) = zmi(ni + 1)
￿ ￿ wi(ni)ni ￿ ci(ni) (12)




i(ni)ni + wi + c
0
i(ni) (13)
Solving for zmi and substituting the expression into (11) yields:







i(ni)ni + wi + c
0
i(ni)
The left side of this equation is the marginal bene￿ts of leverage; the right is the
marginal costs. These are equal at the point where partner i￿ s bid curve is tangent to
the wage-leverage surface he or she faces. To see where identi￿cation of ￿ comes from, it





where ARi and MCi are the average revenues per lawyer and the marginal cost of leverage
at o¢ ce i. Taking logs and rearranging, we obtain:
lnARi ￿ lnMCi = ￿ln￿ + ln"i (15)
lnARi ￿ ln[w
0
i(ni)ni + wi + c
0
i(ni)] = ￿ln￿ + ln"i (16)
We use this equation to estimate ￿. The ￿rst term of our dependent variable is just
30revenues per lawyer, which we observe in our data. The second term contains two
variables we do not observe directly: w0
i(ni) and c0
i(ni): The ￿rst of these terms is the
marginal price of leverage; as noted above, we use our coe¢ cient estimates of the wage-
leverage surface regression described above to construct an estimate of w0
i(ni) for every
o¢ ce.
We obtain an estimate of c0
i(ni) from data on nonlawyer payroll and our estimate of the
overhead equation in Section 3. Letting pi equal the number of partners at o¢ ce i, we
specify:
ci(ni) = (xili + ohi)=pi
= xi(1 + ni) + ohi=pi
The ￿rst term is nonlawyer payroll per partner. We assume that xi, nonlawyer pay
per lawyer, is constant. As above, ohi represents overhead expenses. Therefore,
c
0




i(ni) has two parts. One is that hiring an associate requires hiring support sta⁄ as
well; we assume that it requires hiring a proportionate amount of support sta⁄, which
implies an increase in nonlawyer pay of xi. The other part is the increase in overhead.
Following Section 3, the increase in overhead includes increases in fringe bene￿ts ￿15% of
the additional lawyer and nonlawyer payroll associated with hiring an associate. It also
includes the increase in space, computer equipment, etc. that goes along with increasing
the employment size of the o¢ ce. We use the coe¢ cients on employment in the overhead
regression to estimate this for every o¢ ce, remembering that the employment increase that
comes with hiring an additional associate includes a proportionate amount of additional
support sta⁄ as well.
Estimating ￿.￿
Following equation (16), we derive an estimate of ￿ by simply regressing the di⁄erence
between the log of revenues per lawyer and the log of our estimate of the marginal cost of
leverage, described above, on the ￿eld shares of lawyers in each o¢ ce.30 Including the ￿eld
shares on the right side allows the coordination costs of hierarchy to vary across di⁄erent
￿elds of the law. We also include a polynomial of the number of partners in the o¢ ce as
a regressor. This accounts for the possibility that the coordination costs associated with
30As we discuss below, one has to adjust revenues to take into account that overhead increases with
revenues. Our dependent variable uses revenues net of the associated overhead rather than gross revenues.
31leverage might be lower for larger o¢ ces, for example because larger o¢ ces might be able
to more e⁄ectively utilize associates￿time (or perhaps higher if coordination becomes
more unwieldy as o¢ ce size increases) This OLS estimate, while easy to derive, is a
biased estimate because E(ln"i) 6= 0. However, the magnitude of this bias is very small
relative to the estimates themselves, and we have found that accounting for it implies
little change in the results from our counterfactual exercises.31
Dynamics and the Returns to Hierarchy.￿
An important assumption in the model in Section 2 is that agents maximize their
current-period earnings, given their skill. This assumption underlies our empirical spec-
i￿cation as well. This speci￿cation of agents￿objective rules out dynamic aspects of the
labor market, including that individuals value working with higher-skilled agents because
it provides them future bene￿ts, for example in the form of better training or contacts.
Such dynamic aspects are very realistic in our context, but are di¢ cult to incorporate
directly in our equilibrium model. We can, however, analyze how our estimates would
change if our assumption that agents maximize current period earnings were replaced
by one in which agents working as associates place an additional value on working with
higher-skilled partners.
If we have misspeci￿ed agents￿tastes in this way, this will tend to bias downward our
estimates of the return to hierarchy, and our estimates can therefore be thought of as a
lower bound. In terms of the hedonics, the "current period earnings" objective function
ensures that there exists a single market wage-leverage surface (represented by equation
(10)) o⁄ of which all agents optimize, and consequently that partners face the same
marginal price schedule w0(n), regardless of their skill. If instead associates are willing
to work for less for higher-skilled partners, then our estimate of w0(n) will understate
the marginal price of leverage faced by each individual manager; a manager of a given
skill will ￿nd it more expensive to increase leverage because it will cost him more at the
margin to outbid a slightly-higher-skilled manager for a slightly-higher-skilled associate.
Our estimates of the marginal cost of leverage will then be too low. If so, this will lead
our estimate of ￿, which is identi￿ed by the ratio of marginal cost and average revenues,
also to be biased downward. This, in turn, will lead us to underestimate the returns to
leverage, since a too-low ￿ implies that we overstate the extent to which the potential
returns to leverage are eaten up by coordination costs.
31The bias arises because, applying Jensen￿ s inequality, E("i) = 1 implies E(ln"i) 6= 0. If "i is
distributed log-normally with parameters ￿ and ￿2, the assumption E("i) = 1 implies ln"i is distributed
N(￿￿2=2;￿2), and thus an OLS estimate of ￿ln￿ is biased by ￿￿2=2. Following the discussion in
Goldberger (1968) and van Garderen (2001), we have estimated this equation using maximum likelihood
under the assumption of log-normality to obtain consistent estimates of ￿. The estimates of ￿ are almost
identical to those we report; they are lower by about 0.02 relative to a mean value of about 0.70.
32We discuss the quantitative impact this has on our estimates below. To preview, our
investigations lead us to believe that leads to only a small bias on our estimates of the
returns to hierarchy.
Relatedly, while our analysis largely abstracts from the details of internal labor markets,
there is an issue of whether this abstraction leads us to misestimate the marginal cost of
leverage, and hence ￿. In particular, one can imagine a multi-period model inspired by
tournament theory in which part of the marginal cost of an associate is a prize paid by
incumbent partners to the most promising associates in the form of a transfer they receive
from incumbent partners upon promotion. If this is the case, our analysis understates the
marginal cost of leverage, and hence our estimates of the returns to hierarchy are a lower
bound by the same logic as above. We think this perspective is incomplete, however,
because characterizing promotions as a cost to incumbent partners ignores the prospec-
tive client-generation-related bene￿ts of promoting promising lawyers. From incumbent
partners￿perspective, it is probably not a cost to promote lawyers who are expected to
be at least as productive as existing partners.32 If so, the promotion-related "prize" that
accrues to the most promising associates should not be considered part of the marginal
cost of leverage.
V.3 Estimation
We begin by estimating the w(n) surface, using o¢ ces with at least one associate.
Results are reported in Table 7. Our estimates imply that w0(n) is positive, and close to
constant for the "business, non-litigation" o¢ ces and the "litigation" o¢ ces. Ignoring the
insigni￿cant second-order terms, the estimates imply that increasing the associate/partner
ratio by one is associated with a $7,552 and $4,032 increase in average associate pay,
respectively. Looking at the "individual, non-litigation" o¢ ces, w(n) is convex, but
w0(n) is very close to zero for the bulk of the o¢ ces in this subsample (which have an
associate-partner ratio between 0.5 and 1.5). Unlike in the other segments, the wage-
leverage surface in this segment is essentially ￿ at.33
In Table 8, we report the mean and various quantiles of marginal cost implied by these
estimates. We also report analogous ￿gures for the various components of marginal cost
of leverage. On average, the marginal cost of hiring an additional associate is $139,000,
though there is wide dispersion across o¢ ces. Our estimates imply that, on average,
the pay the additional associate receives is only 45% of the marginal cost of adding an
32Levin and Tadelis (2006) propose that partnerships￿pro￿t-sharing aspects provide incumbent partners
an incentive to only add new partners that raise the partnership￿ s average skill level.
33In speci￿cations where we allow for only a linear relationship with n, the coe¢ cient is small and
statistically insigni￿cant. A ￿ at wage-leverage surface is consistent with a model in which quality and
quantity of workers￿human capital are perfect substitutes; see Section II.
33associate. A signi￿cant share of the marginal cost is made up of the additional associate￿ s
support sta⁄(on average, 28%), the cost of the associate and sta⁄￿ s fringe bene￿ts (11%),
and the cost of the additional overhead (13%). Although the surface relating the cost of
leverage to leverage, P(n) = w(n)n, is convex, the combined fact that w0(n) is generally
not very high and leverage levels tend to be low implies that the marginal price of leverage,
w0(n)n, makes up a very small part of the marginal cost of leverage throughout our sample.
We also report various quantiles of average revenues per lawyer across o¢ ces in our
sample. Comparing these to our marginal cost estimates foreshadows our estimate of ￿
below, which is identi￿ed by the ratio of the marginal cost and average bene￿t of leverage.
Average revenues per lawyer are about $247,000, but the distribution of average revenues
per lawyer is highly skewed across o¢ ces. Multiplying revenues per lawyer at each o¢ ce
by our estimate of the overhead share of revenues (derived from Table 2 ￿some revenues
are "pass-through" expenses) gives an estimate of the average bene￿ts of leverage. The
quantiles of the average bene￿ts distribution are 40-60% higher than our estimates of
marginal cost, suggesting that f(n;￿) is not constant returns: ￿ will be less than one.
The right side of Table 7 reports our estimates of equation (15). We allow ￿ln￿ to
be a function of the number of partners and the ￿eld shares of the lawyers in the o¢ ce:
if the ratio between (estimated) marginal costs and average bene￿ts varies systematically
with lawyers￿￿eld, ￿ will di⁄er across o¢ ces. The omitted ￿eld in this speci￿cation is
"general practice," lawyers who work in more than one of the Census-de￿ned ￿elds. The
estimate on the constant implies a value of ￿ of 0.71: for a one-partner o¢ ce consisting
only of general practitioners, moving from n = 0 to n = 1 increases the time to which
the partner￿ s knowledge is applied by (20:71-1), or 64%. In other words, hiring your ￿rst
associate is like adding two-thirds of an extra body to your group in terms of how it a⁄ects
the group￿ s time in production. Relative to a situation where two lawyers work on their
own, hierarchical production decreases the time these lawyers spend in production by
18%. This estimate varies little with the number of partners in the o¢ ce. Although the
coe¢ cients on the number of partners are jointly statistically signi￿cant, they are small
in magnitude, and imply that ￿ decreases from 0.71 to 0.68 for a 50-partner o¢ ce, then
increases back to 0.70 for a 100-partner o¢ ce. In contrast we ￿nd larger di⁄erences in ￿
across ￿elds. Our estimate of ￿ is lowest ￿about 0.50 ￿for an o¢ ce with all negligence-
plainti⁄lawyers, and highest ￿about 0.87 ￿for an o¢ ce with only specialists in corporate
law, suggesting that the coordination costs associated with hierarchies tend to be high for
the former and low for the latter.
Our estimates re￿ ect that average revenues per lawyer are generally high relative to
the estimated marginal cost of leverage, which indicates that there must be diminishing
returns on the revenue side associated with hiring additional associates. Our theoretical
model attributes these diminishing returns to coordination costs which reduce the time
34lawyers spend in directly-productive activities; however, they may re￿ ect other unmodeled
factors as well, such as decreasing returns from the time partners spend in business-
generating activities. What is important for our analysis is quantifying ￿ rather than
distinguishing between the various possible sources of diminishing returns, as this set of
parameters serves as an input to the counterfactuals that we discuss next.
V.4 The Returns to Vertical Specialization
We ￿rst use our estimates to quantify the returns to hierarchical production. Our
counterfactual is this. Suppose the match between clients and o¢ ces stayed the same,
but the division of labor was constrained, so that partners and associates do not split
work with each other optimally, but instead each works on a representative share of their
o¢ ce￿ s problems, and no collaboration is allowed. What would be the value of the lost
production?
Consider this calculation for a hierarchy with one partner and n associates, referring
again to Figure 1. This o¢ ce￿ s revenues, which are observed in the data, are TRi =
b zmi(1 + ni)￿. Absent the division labor, the o¢ ce￿ s revenues would equal b zmi + nib zwi,
where b zwi = "izwi: In expectation this quantity is less than b zmi + niwi, because wi > zwi:
from Figure 2, in expectation, associates earn more as associates than they would if
they worked on their own. A lower bound for the increase in the value of production
a⁄orded by vertical specialization at o¢ ce i, averaged across the lawyers in the o¢ ce, is
therefore b zmi((1 + ni)￿ ￿ 1) ￿ niwi)=(ni + 1). We calculate this quantity for every o¢ ce
in our sample, exploiting the fact that b zmi = TRi=(1 + ni)￿ and using our estimate of
￿ from the production function estimation. We also calculate this quantity under the
assumption that ￿ = 1, which corresponds to constant returns to leverage. We therefore
compare actual revenues per lawyer against two benchmarks. One is revenues per lawyer
if vertical specialization were prohibited within o¢ ces: this provides evidence on the
achieved returns from vertical specialization. The other is revenues per lawyer if vertical
specialization were allowed and there were no coordination costs. This provides evidence
on the potential returns from vertical specialization (but which coordination costs limit).
Table 9 reports the results of this analysis. We include o¢ ces with and without
associates in the analysis, though of course the returns to hierarchy are zero for o¢ ces
without associates. Average revenues per lawyer in our sample equals $227,000. We
estimate that they would be $175,000 if the division of labor were arbitrary. From
Table 9, vertical specialization associated with hierarchies increases productivity in the
U.S. legal services industry by at least 30%. This ranges considerably across o¢ ces.
We calculated the distribution of the percentage increase across o¢ ces (weighted by the
number of lawyers). The 90th percentile is 58%; the median is 26%. The ￿nal column in
35Table 9 reports analogous estimates for the ￿ = 1 case ￿no coordination costs associated
with hierarchical production. These estimates imply that revenues per lawyer, holding
constant the matching between lawyers and between clients and ￿rms, would increase to
about $280,000, implying that coordination costs prevent lawyers from achieving about
1/2 of the potential gains from vertical specialization.
Our estimates thus imply that organizing production hierarchically increases produc-
tivity in legal services substantially ￿by at least 30%. The overall returns to hierarchy
appear to be substantial in this human-capital-intensive industry.
We have examined the robustness of this result to the possibility that the labor market
equilibrium might be a⁄ected by dynamics not present in this model. As discussed above,
dynamic elements that lead associates to be willing to work for less under more skilled
partners lead us to understate the marginal price of leverage, and thus the marginal cost
of leverage, faced by any particular partner. We report in Table 7 that the marginal price
of leverage is very low for nearly all partners, only $4,000 on average. We explored the
robustness of our estimates by assuming that the marginal price of leverage is two, four,
and ten times as much as our estimates imply. Our estimates of the returns to leverage
do increase ￿as discussed above, our previous results are a lower bound ￿but not by
much. Assuming that the marginal price of leverage is ten times what we estimate ￿
$40,000 rather than $4,000 on average, our estimates imply that hierarchical organization
increases productivity by 40% rather than 30%.
The reason such large di⁄erences in marginal price of leverage have small e⁄ects on our
estimates is straightforward. Increasing the marginal price of leverage, even by a large
amount, implies a much smaller percentage change in the marginal cost of leverage and
a moderate increase in our estimate of ￿. Even after the change, the estimate implies
signi￿cant decreasing returns to leverage for most o¢ ces. Furthermore, recall that n is
small at most o¢ ces. A moderate increase in the estimated returns to leverage in an
industry where most entities are low-leverage to begin with implies a very small change
in the estimates of the returns to leverage that are in fact achieved.34
V.5 Hierarchy and Earnings Distributions
We next use our estimates of ￿ and equation (11) to derive estimates of Ri(zmi;0) =
b zmi ￿ ci(0) at o¢ ces with associates: this is what partners at these o¢ ces would earn,
absent hierarchical production. This di⁄ers from b zmi because it accounts for the costs of
operating a zero-associate o¢ ce. We estimate b zmi the same way we do in the previous
subsection. From section V.2, ci(0) = xi + ohi=pi, the sum of nonlawyer pay per lawyer
34It has a similarly small e⁄ect on our estimate of how hierarchy a⁄ects earnings distributions, a topic
we discuss in the next subsection.
36and overhead per partner. We estimate ohi for each o¢ ce using the coe¢ cients in the
overhead equation. We compute quantiles of the distribution of these variables across
the leveraged partners in our sample, and compare them to quantiles associated with our
observations of partner pay.
Figure 7 reports twenty quantiles of partner pay and Ri(zmi;0), using only partners in
o¢ ces with at least one associate; the di⁄erence between the two curves re￿ ects the e⁄ect
of leverage on the earnings of individuals who are, in fact, leveraged. Median earnings
among lawyers in this group are $167,000. Our estimates imply that, absent hierarchical
production, the median instead would be $148,000, about 13% lower. Partner pay is
15-20% higher than Ri(zmi;0) between the median and the 80th percentile, but is 35%
and 50% higher at the 90th and 95th percentile, respectively. Considering only leveraged
partners, lawyers￿ability to leverage their knowledge through working with associates
increases earnings inequality, producing a substantially more skewed earnings distribution.
The di⁄erence between the 95th percentile and 50th percentile earnings increases from
$208,000 to $364,000, and the ratio between these two percentiles increases from 2.4 to
3.2.
Figure 8 extends the analysis to all lawyers, not just leveraged partners, as we include
unleveraged partners and associates in the construction of our earnings distributions.
This Figure depicts the distribution of lawyer pay and "estimated pay absent hierarchies."
"Estimated pay absent hierarchies" equals Ri(zmi;0) for leveraged partners, as before. It
equals actual pay for unleveraged partners ￿we observe what these individuals did earn
when unleveraged. For associates, we also assume that "estimated pay absent hierarchies"
equals their actual pay. This is a biased estimate for the reason described above: these
individuals earn more as associates than they would absent hierarchies. Thus, since
associates tend to be below the median earnings, quantiles of "estimated pay absent
hierarchies" below the median will tend to be upward-biased. This will have little e⁄ect
on our analysis, however, because we are most interested in upper tail of this distribution
and how it compares to that of the overall pay distribution.
The Figure indicates that, when looking across all lawyers, hierarchical production tends
to make earnings distributions more skewed, but this e⁄ect is concentrated on the very
upper parts of the earnings distribution. The di⁄erence between this and the previous
Figure re￿ ects the simple fact that well over half of lawyers are unleveraged ￿they are
either unleveraged partners or associates ￿and the vast majority of these lawyers are below
the 70th percentile in both of these earnings distributions. Our estimates indicate that
hierarchical production leaves median earnings unchanged, but increases 95th percentile
earnings by 31%. The ratio between the 95th percentile and median earnings increases
from 3.7 to 4.8. Hierarchical production makes an already relatively skewed earnings
distribution even more skewed. This is even more pronounced if the Figure extended to
37percentiles greater than the 95th.35
Finally, Figure 9 depicts these distributions separately for lawyers in the three classes
of o¢ ces we de￿ned earlier: "business, non-litigation," "individual, non-litigation," and
"litigation" o¢ ces. The Figure indicates that hierarchical production has a similar e⁄ect
on the earnings distribution among lawyers in "business non-litigation" and "litigation"
o¢ ces, increasing the ratio between the 95th percentile and median earnings from about
3.0 to about 4.2. The estimates suggest that skill-based earnings inequality is similar
among these classes of lawyers,36 and that hierarchical production ampli￿es this inequality
similarly. In both cases, the 95th percentile of partner pay is close to 60% higher than
Ri(zmi;0), and hierarchical production has a broader-based impact on earnings than that
in Figure 8. In contrast, lawyers in "individual, non-litigation" o¢ ces look much di⁄erent;
hierarchical production has a very small impact on the earnings distribution. Although
lawyers in these o¢ ces tend to earn much less than lawyers in the other classes of o¢ ces,
there is actually more earnings inequality by some measures. In part due to a long lower
tail, the ratio between the 95th percentile and the median is 5.6. Absent hierarchical
production, this would decrease only marginally, to 5.1. The returns to hierarchy are low
in this segment of the industry, and this is re￿ ected in low levels of leverage, even among
the relatively small share of lawyers in this segment who are leveraged partners, and in
the fact that average revenues per lawyer among o¢ ces with associates in this segment
tend to be low. The latter implies a low return to hierarchy, even when the marginal cost
of leverage is low, because it implies that the partner￿ s skill cannot be high. The Figure
8 result that, overall, the impact of hierarchical production on earnings is concentrated
on lawyers on the upper tail of the earnings distribution in part re￿ ects that it has little
e⁄ect on lawyers in this segment, who make up about 25% of privately-practicing lawyers
in the U.S.
Combined, these results provide evidence on how organizational structure ￿here, hi-
erarchical production ￿can have a substantial e⁄ect on productivity through gains to
vertical specialization and on the earnings distribution, especially in segments where in-
dividuals are confronted with problems with varying degrees of complexity. We estimate
that, holding the match between problems and o¢ ces constant, lawyers￿ability to organize
work hierarchically increases revenue-weighted output by at least 30%. Outside of the
sector that deals within individuals￿non-litigation-related demands, it also signi￿cantly
ampli￿es earnings inequality. However, it is important to place this ampli￿cation result in
35Census disclosure regulations limit our ability to report results from very high percentiles, because
these results would be based on a relatively small number of observations.
36There is an important caveat to this statement: we are not reporting earnings above the 95th per-
centile, to avoid disclosure problems associated with Census microdata. In any given year, the highest-
earning lawyers in the U.S. tend to be specialists in litigation who receive a share of the proceeds from a
large case.
38context. Lawyers can exploit increasing returns associated with their knowledge, but our
estimates imply that it is very di¢ cult for them to do so ￿there are sharply diminishing
returns to leverage. This di¢ culty may be typical of human-capital-intensive production
where leverage implies applying one person￿ s knowledge to others￿time. When the scaling
up is over physical capital ￿as in Lucas (1978) ￿the organizational problems associated
with leverage may be much less severe, and one might expect to see much more earnings
inequality.
VI. CONCLUSION
Earnings and assignments contain important information about the nature of produc-
tion and the value of organization that has been empirically ignored by organizational
economists until now. Using this information requires embedding organizations in an
equilibrium model. We have taken a ￿rst step towards exploiting this information by
embedding an organizational model in a labor market equilibrium with heterogeneous
individuals. This step has costs, as it leads us to abstract from many details of internal
labor markets that are the focus of much of the organizational economics literature, in par-
ticular, how organizations respond to the problem of providing individuals incentives. But
it also generates enormous bene￿ts, in allowing us to exploit previously underexploited
information to quantify an e⁄ect that organization has on productivity and earnings dis-
tributions.
Speci￿cally, we study how much hierarchical production increases lawyers￿productivity
and ampli￿es skill-based earnings inequality. We have done this in two stages. First,
we have explored the empirical implications of an equilibrium model of a hierarchy in
a knowledge economy developed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). The model
embeds a production function characterized by limited substitution between the quality
and quantity of individuals￿human capital, complementarity between individuals￿skills,
and increasing returns to knowledge in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We show
that the model captures reasonably well some important empirical regularities concerning
lawyers￿earnings and organization, such as positive assortative matching, scale e⁄ects
associated with managerial skill, and strati￿cation by skill. Second, we then take this
model as a maintained assumption and estimate its parameters in order to construct
counterfactual productivity and earnings distributions ￿what lawyers would produce and
earn if it were not possible for highly-skilled lawyers to leverage their talent by working
with associates. We conclude that hierarchies expand substantially the productivity of
lawyers: they increase aggregate output by at least 30%, relative to non-hierarchical
production in which there is no vertical specialization within o¢ ces. We also ￿nd that
hierarchies expand substantially earnings inequality, increasing the ratio between the 95th
39percentile and median earnings among lawyers from 3.7 to 4.8, mostly by increasing
substantially earnings of the very highest percentile lawyers in business and litigation-
related segments, and leaving other lawyers￿earnings relatively una⁄ected.
Re￿ ecting on our results, we conjecture that while hierarchies contribute substantially
to productivity and earnings inequality in our context, their e⁄ect on productivity and
especially earnings might be far smaller than in other contexts. In industries where
production is more physical-capital intensive, top-level managers sometimes earn multiples
in the hundreds of times of what their subordinates earn, and they control enormous
organizations (see Gabaix and Landier, 2006). We speculate that the complexity and
customization of problem-solving in law ￿rms limits the ability of agents to leverage their
human capital: coordination costs are relatively high, as production requires some agent
to spend time on each problem and communicating the speci￿cs of an unsolved or new
problem is costly. More work is necessary in order to uncover systematic di⁄erences in
the return to knowledge across sectors and to link such di⁄erences to the characteristics
of the knowledge involved. Time and knowledge are both scarce inputs, and exploiting
increasing returns associated with knowledge depends critically on how much time must
be expended in doing so.
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42APPENDIX A. REGRESSION VERSION OF FIGURE 6
Table A1 depicts a regression version of this Figure and tests whether the relationships
depicted in the Figure are statistically signi￿cant. The Table reports results from six
regressions. These regressions take the form:
yi = ￿ + ￿2Di2 + ::: + ￿10Di10 + ￿Zi + "i
In the ￿rst column, yi is a dummy variable that equals one if lawyer i works in a county
with fewer than 20,000 employees and zero otherwise, Dij is a dummy variable that equals
one if lawyer i￿ s earnings are at least decile j, and Zi is a vector including the share of
lawyers in the o¢ ce who are in each of the 13 ￿elds in our data.37 The other columns
contain analogous speci￿cations using the dummy variables that equal one if lawyer i
works in each of the ￿ve other market size categories we construct. The sum of the
coe¢ cients in the rows equals zero by construction, since the estimates in any one of the
rows are implied by the other ￿ve. Like in our analysis of strati￿cation, our observations
are at the o¢ ce*organizational position level, and all speci￿cations weight observations
using the product of the number of lawyers the observation represents and the Census
sampling weight associated with the o¢ ce. The variables of interest in these speci￿cations
are the ￿i￿ s, which indicate whether the share of lawyers in decile i is greater or less than
that in decile i ￿ 1.
These regressions indicate that the patterns depicted in Figure 3 are statistically signif-
icant for the most part, and are robust to controlling for systematic di⁄erences in lawyers￿
earnings across ￿elds. For example, the coe¢ cients in the ￿rst column of Table A1
indicate a signi￿cant decrease, then a signi￿cant increase as one moves down the table.
Similar statistically signi￿cant changes in sign appear in the other columns as well.
We think these patterns are interesting, though they are admittedly not dispositive. It
would be far better to conduct this analysis with individual-level earnings data. Some
of the clustering of earnings may be due to the fact that our o¢ ce-level data forces us to
ignore heterogeneity in earnings among associates and among partners who work in the
same o¢ ce. This would be a particular problem in situations where much of the earnings
heterogeneity across associates and across partners within local markets is within rather
than across ￿rms. We have investigated this by conducting a similar analysis using
lawyers data from the PUMS database described above. The problem with using the
PUMS data for this exercise is that it is top-coded above $99,000 1991 dollars, and
therefore allows us to construct earnings distributions only for roughly the bottom two-
thirds of the distribution. We analyzed these data, and found a similar pattern to that
37Including the latter controls for cross-￿eld di⁄erences in lawyers￿earnings, but the patterns in the
coe¢ cients change little when excluding this vector.
43in our data: the within-market-size earning distributions exhibit a mode that increases
with market size, similar to the lower mode in Figure 3 though less pronounced. The
fact that it is less pronounced might re￿ ect the di⁄erence between using individual- and
o¢ ce*organizational position data. This evidence leads us to believe that the patterns we
depict are not just an artifact of aggregation, though aggregation might exaggerate these
patterns. Top-coding prevents us from investigating whether, like in our data, there is
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Wage-Leverage Surface, Production Function Estimates
Partnerships and Proprietorships With At Least One Associate (N=5319)
Constant 0.343
(0.010)
Associates/Partner -- "Business, Non-Litigation Offices" 7.552 Number of Partners 0.0015
(2.580) (0.0004)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Business, Non-Litigation Offices" -0.828 Number of Partners**2 -1.43E-06
(0.665) (2.81E-06)
Associates/Partner -- "Litigation Offices" 4.032
(2.264)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Litigation Offices" -0.209
(0.562)
Associates/Partner -- "Individual, Non-Litigation Offices" -5.179
(3.163)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Individual, Non-Litigation Offices" 2.304
(0.831)
Share(Banking Law Specialist) 9.039 Share(Banking Law Specialist) -0.026
(3.285) (0.038)
Share(Corporate Law Specialist) 35.957 Share(Corporate Law Specialist) -0.198
(3.050) (0.028)
Share(Insurance Law Specialist) 8.515 Share(Insurance Law Specialist) -0.095
(2.399) (0.020)
Share(Negligence-Defense Specialist) 9.027 Share(Negligence-Defense Specialist) 0.047
(2.506) (0.021)
Share(Patent Law Specialist) 22.479 Share(Patent Law Specialist) -0.076
(2.856) (0.029)
Share(Government Law Specialist) 19.534 Share(Government Law Specialist) 0.043
(3.656) (0.044)
Share(Environmental Law Specialist) 24.839 Share(Environmental Law Specialist) 0.137
(5.416) (0.067)
Share(Real Estate Law Specialist) 14.281 Share(Real Estate Law Specialist) -0.140
(2.582) (0.035)
Share(Tax Law Specialist) 27.125 Share(Tax Law Specialist) 0.057
(5.623) (0.063)
Share(Criminal Law Specialist) -1.632 Share(Criminal Law Specialist) 0.060
(1.074) (0.046)
Share(Domestic Law Specialist) -1.073 Share(Domestic Law Specialist) 0.136
(3.742) (0.053)
Share(Negligence-Plaintiff Specialist) 12.763 Share(Negligence-Plaintiff Specialist) 0.343
(2.514) (0.025)
Share(Probate Law Specialist) 7.037 Share(Probate Law Specialist) -0.129
(4.433) (0.057)
Share(Other Specialist) 11.035 Share(Other Specialist) 0.005
(1.494) (0.017)
R-Squared 0.49 0.06
The dependent variable in the wage-leverage surface regression is average associate pay in the office.  Offices with at least one lawyer specializing in insurance
or negligence law are classified as "litigation" offices.  All other offices are classified as "business" or "individual" depending on whether the majority of their
revenues come from individuals.  This regression includes county fixed effects as well as the variables above.
The dependent variable in the production function is ln(revenues/lawyer*(1-K))-ln(MC), where K is the coefficient on revenues in the overhead regression
for the office, and MC is the estimated marginal cost of leverage for the office.  The coefficients reported here correspond to -ln(theta) in the text.
The 0.343 coefficient estimate for the constant implies an estimate of theta of 0.710 for an office of general practitioners (the omitted category).
Bold indicates rejection of the hypothesis b=0 using a one-tailed t-test of size 0.05.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Non-Hierarchical and Hierarchical Production. The panel depicts
production absent hierarchies; sets of problems are allocated to lawyers arbitrarily and each
lawyer applies their time and knowledge toward whatever set they confront. Output is zm+nzw.
The bottom panel depicts output under hierarchical production. The n+1 lawyers have (n+1)￿
units of e⁄ective time to solve problems. Lawyers divide work so that the n associates handle
the easiest parts and the partner handles the hardest parts of the problems the group confronts.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This  Figure  depicts  the  how  the  distribution  of  lawyers  across
earnings deciles varies across local markets of different sizes.
We  developed  this  Figure  in  the  following  way.    Fir st,  we
computed  earnings  deciles  across  all  markets,  and  assigned
associates  and  partners  within  each  office  to  earnings  deciles
accordingly.    Then,  we  computed   and  plotted   frequency
distributions  of  lawyers  across  these  deciles  within  market  size
categories. The first bar of the top panel indicates that 2 6.3% of
lawyers in counties with less than 20,000 employees have earnings
that put them in the 1
st decile, when earnings deciles are calculated
across all markets.   If earnings distributions are identical  across
differently-sized local markets, these frequency plots would depict
uniform distributions.
These plots indicate that, although higher -earning lawyers tend to
work in larger markets, earnings and market size do not appear to
be positively associate d throughout their domains.  Instead, these
frequency  distributions  tend  to  be  bimodal,  with  both  modes
increasing as one moves from smaller to larger local markets.
The earnings deciles are:
10th: 20,000 60th: 94,333
20th: 38,841 70th: 120,711
30th: 53,300 80th: 167,585
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Figure 9. The Distribution of Lawyer Pay, Estimated Pay Absent Hierar-
chies, by O¢ ce Class. This Figure reports 20 quantiles of the distribution of these quantities
for three classes of o¢ ces. "Estimated pay absent hierarchies" is Ri(zm;0) for partners at of-
￿ces with associates. It is the same as lawyer pay for partners at o¢ ces without associates,
as well as for associates. Because associates earn more as associates than they would absent
hierarchies (wi >zwi), this overstates what these individuals would earn in this counterfactual.
This upward bias primarily a⁄ects our estimates of lower quantiles.
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